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I. INTRODUCTION
For the last twenty years, repressive regimes in Latin America
have resorted to a particularly insidious technique that brutally quashes
dissent and denies accountability. Its victims, the desaparecidos (disap-
peared ones), number in the tens of thousands and the dispute over
efforts to determine their fate and whereabouts tears at the fabric of
many Latin American societies. The struggle against disappearances -
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both to abolish and prevent the practice and to hold the malefactors
accountable - has challenged and shaped the human rights movement
in new ways. New entities representing the relatives of the
desaparecidos, by definition single-issue oriented, ,have joined other
human rights organizations and now engage in advocacy both at the
national and international levels.' Since "deniability" is central to the
policy of disappearances, international human rights organizations are
frequently thwarted in their efforts to prevent torture, obtain the re-
lease of unjustly imprisoned persons, and press governments for speedy
trials. All the tried and true techniques developed by inter-governmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs) for those
purposes must be re-examined to deal with disappearances. Finally, the
phenomenon of disappearances has generated the need for a renewed
effort to create substantive and procedural standards in international
law.
A major battle in the struggle against disappearances was recently
won. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights,' a judicial body of
the Organization of American States (OAS), heard three significant
cases between 1986 and 1989 involving disappearances attributed to
the armed and security forces of Honduras. The Court found that Hon-
duras was responsible for violating the American Convention on
Human Rights' by designing and implementing, between 1981 and
1984, a deliberate plan to cause forced disappearances which eventu-
ally claimed the lives of more than 140 victims. The decisions reached
in Velbsquez, Godinez and Fairn and Solis,4 have already become a
I. Perhaps the best-known of these groups is the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, based in Bue-
nos Aires, Argentina, founded in 1977. Similar organizations exist in many other countries where
disappearances have become a major human rights problem. In 1984, the Guatemalan counterpart
of the Argentine group, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), became the first human rights organiza-
tion to establish a permanent presence in that country in 1984, after many years during which any
human rights advocacy was harshly repressed. See Americas Watch, Guatemala: The Group for
Mutual Support (1985). There are also international organizations of relatives: the Federaci6n de
Familiares de Desaparecidos de Am6rica Latina (FEDEFAM) was founded in 1981 and has of-
fices in Caracas, Venezuela. The Asociaci6n Centro-Americana de Familiares de Desaparecidos
(ACAFADE), based in San Jos6, Costa Rica, since 1982, played a large role in the cases discused
in this article. See ACAFADE Desaparecidos en Centroambrica en 1989 [The Disappeared in
Central America in 1989](1990).
2. Hereinafter "the Court."
3. Also known as "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica" signed on November 22, 1969, Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS), Treaty Series, no. 36; United Nations (UN) Register, August 27,
1979, no. 17955 [hereinafter "the Convention"].
4. Velbsquez Judgment, INTER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988); Godinez Judgment, IN-
TER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 5 (1989); Fairbn Garbi and Soils Corrales Judgment, INTER-AM.
CT.H.R. (set. C) No. 6 (1989).
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milestone in the development of international safeguards for human
rights. The holdings and language of the Court will add precedential
strength to the arguments of those seeking to abolish disappearances.
Furthermore, the developments in the course of litigation, spanning
more than four years, will undoubtedly yield valuable lessons to human
rights practitioners.
Though the cases have already generated some press attention as
well as scholarly articles,5 the necessary in-depth examination of these
cases has only just begun. The present article is an effort to contribute
to a critical debate, not only on what has already been accomplished,
but also on what needs to be done next to completely abolish forced
disappearances.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF DISAPPEARANCES
A. Conceptual Problems
The term ."disappearance" is really a euphemism: in practical
terms it means that a person has been arbitrarily arrested, yet the au-
thorities deny it. The term was first used in Guatemala in the 1960s
when many political opponents of the regime were abducted, never to
be heard from again. In Chile and Argentina during the 1970s this
technique became systematic; it became the main feature in the repres-
sive arsenal of the Argentine military dictatorship that ruled the coun-
try between 1976 and 1983. Thousands of people disappeared in El
Salvador in the early 1980s, along with thousands more whose bodies
were eventually found.
In most countries, such as Chile, Argentina and Honduras, disap-
pearances are conducted during a definite period and at some point the
practice stops. In others such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru and Co-
lombia, a steady stream of disappearances is recorded every year, and
though there may be a pronounced decrease in numbers the practice
never seems to stop altogether. At the same time, disappearances are
not restricted to military regimes: currently, the highest number of re-
5. Note, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Towards Establishing an Effective
Regional Contentious Jurisdiction, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 127 (1990); Shelton, Private
Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1990);
Shelton, Judicial Review of State Action by International Courts, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 361
(1989); Drucker, Governmental Liability for 'Disappearances': A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 289 (1989); Deodhar, First Contentious
Cases Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 283
(1988); Human Rights Court in Honduras (sic): Velhsquez Case, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1989);
Drucker, Sweet Justice, 115 COMMONWEAL 455 (1988).
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ported cases comes from Peru and Colombia, both governed by demo-
cratically elected authorities. It is apparent, however, that disappear-
ances take place in countries where the military establishment is either
in power or has a high degree of autonomy from civilian authority.
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by per-
sons acting under some form of governmental authority. In many coun-
tries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are gener-
ally specialized, highly secret bodies within the armed or security
forces. They are generally directed through a separate, clandestine
chain of command but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or
prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities
take their victims to secret detention centers where they subject them
to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls.
In fact, a necessary feature of the policy of disappearances is to ensure
insulation from court inspections and controls. As a result, habeas
corpus relief and other institutional safeguards to protect individuals
from abuse are rendered completely ineffective.
In many countries there are victims who have survived the experi-
ence. For the most part, however, the policy includes the decision to
eliminate the victim as soon as he or she ceases to provide any intelli-
gence, and to dispose of the corpse in a way to ensure the continued
"deniability" of the process.
The victim of a disappearance generally fits the profile of a grass-
roots or rank-and-file political activist in opposition to the government.
The victims are often students, teachers, labor organizers, peasant lead-
ers, lawyers who defend political prisoners or religious workers. For the
most part, the authorities who design the strategy have in mind a rela-
tively targeted sector: if they are trying to defeat an armed insurgency,
they cause to disappear not only armed guerrillas but also suspected
members of networks providing logistical or political support. Soon,
however, the net that is cast broadens, and many victims no longer
have any relationship with the insurgency and, indeed, in many cases
are known to have repudiated it. There may be an initial military crite-
rion for the determination of victims, but in all cases the selection of
targets is soon based on ideology.
Human rights organizations confronted the phenomenon, mostly in
the late 1970s, and were faced with a variety of handicaps. The previ-
ously perfected techniques used to pressure governments for the release
of political prisoners were useless when governments denied holding the
victim. There was always sketchy information, if any, about the victim
and, more importantly, relating the circumstances of his or her abduc-
507]
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tion. NGOs shared experience and information to develop effective tac-
tics against disappearances.
An initial challenge was to find a workable definition of the phe-
nomenon, to distinguish it from situations that could be analogous but
would clearly warrant different responses. Some of those similar situa-
tions are: persons missing in the course of catastrophes or armed con-
flict; persons subjected to prolonged incommunicado detention; and ab-
duction for ransom or hostage-taking by insurgents.
Some colleagues in the human rights movement insist that the def-
inition should be broad, and need only include the element of deliberate
concealment. The authors have chosen a concept that is somewhat
more narrow, one that we believe is the prevailing definition. 6 The exis-
tence of a deliberate, state-sponsored plan is the central element in dis-
appearances. Occasions on which authorities are slow to acknowledge a
detention because of bureaucratic lassitude are therefore not included.
Premeditated governmental plans will usually be devised in response to
a certain political challenge; as a result, a policy of disappearances is
directed against political "enemies of the State." Even though this defi-
nition includes the decision to eventually eliminate most of the
desaparecidos, there will always be survivors who are spared for differ-
ent reasons. Thus, distinguishing between "permanent" and "tempo-
rary" disappearances is useful, as long as a clear intent to deny the fact
of the arrest can be found in the latter.
B. Disappearances and International Law
The existing human rights instruments were drafted before disap-
pearances became a recognizable practice that shocked the conscience
of humankind.7 As a result, those instruments do not contemplate dis-
6. Amnesty International, DISAPPEARANCES: A WORKBOOK (April 1981); Asamblea
Permanente de Derechos Humanos (APDH), LA DESAPARICION: CRIMEN CONTRA LA
HUMANIDAD [DISAPPEARANCES: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY](1988).
7. Declarations and multi-lateral treaties on human rights of a general nature came into
being after World War Ii. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and pro-
claimed by UN General Assembly Resolution 217-A (III) (December 10, 1948); Int'l Covenants
on Civil and Political and on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI) (December 16, 1966); the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force on March 23, 1976, and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Economic Rights on January 3, 1976. Law-making in the area of human
rights is not over yet, but present efforts are directed at the creation of mechanisms of protection
(European Convention on the Protection of Detainees from Torture and from Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by Recommendation 971 (1983), Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (1983); Rapporteurs and Working Groups created by the UN
Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council), or deal with specific forms of
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appearances as a specific violation. Nonetheless, separate aspects of dis-
appearances clearly violate fundamental rights contemplated in those
instruments. Similarly, they constitute clearly defined violations of dif-
ferent standards in domestic law, even if "disappearance" is not con-
templated as a specific crime. An act of forced disappearance violates
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, the right to the physical in-
tegrity of the person and, eventually, the right to life. The deliberate
deprivation of access to judicial relief for the arbitrary arrest is, itself,
a violation of the right to due process of law. The special conditions of
detention of a disappeared person violate several provisions of the U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.8 Some have
argued that a State's refusal to acknowledge the arrest also violates a
person's right to be recognized as a person under the law."
The existing body of international law is more than sufficient to
find that disappearances are a serious abuse of a State's international
obligations. Even so, efforts have been undertaken to draft and enact
multi-lateral instruments to define and delegitimize the practice, and to
create effective mechanisms to deter it and provide relief for the
victims.
A major effort is under way to develop a consensus to define disap-
pearances as a "crime against humanity.""0 This concept was devel-
oped during the Nuremberg trials and carries the effect of raising the
specific violation to the level of an "international crime." Offenses of
this nature are not subject to statutes of limitations, perpetrators can-
not benefit from the political exception to extradition, and in addition,
governments have a duty to investigate, prosecute and punish each ac-
tion.11 The drafting efforts presently under way with regard to disap-
violations (Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, approved and proposed
for signature and ratification or accession by G.A. Res. 260 A (I11) of December 9, 1948 (entered
into force on January 12, 1951); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 1984 (entered into force June 1987)).
8. U.N. Economic and Social Council (ESC) E.S.C. Res. 663, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. 1,
U.N. Doe. E/3048 (July 31, 1957); E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. E/
5988 (1977).
9. Article 16, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 3, American
Convention. See UN/ECOSOC, Report of the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Dis-
appearances, UN Comm'n of Human Rights, 40th Session, E/CN.4/1984/21 (December 9,
1983).
10. Article 4, Draft Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons,
proposed by the Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights to the OAS General Assembly,
Comm'n Annual Report 1987-88, OAS/Ser.L/V/I 1.74, at 351; Report of the Working Group,
supra note 9; La Desaparicibn, supra note 6; Colloquium: The Policy of Forced Disappearances,
Paris (January 31-February 1, 1981), Resolutions and Declarations, APDH, Buenos Aires (1981).
11. Crimes against humanity include "inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, en-
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pearances include specific language delineating these procedures and
attendant consequences.
A temporary setback was suffered by the international human
rights movement when a U.S. district court in San Francisco ruled that
"disappearances" do not have sufficient recognition as an international
crime to warrant consideration as a "tort against the law of Nations"
under the Alien Tort Claims Act."2 The case involved an action for
damages under the Filartiga v. Peha Irala precedent. The court ac-
cepted the action for torture and arbitrary arrest, but denied it for dis-
appearance because no United States legal precedent could be found
citing disappearances as a crime against humanity. This decision
prompted the filing of briefs amicus curiae, as well as a motion to re-
consider by the plaintiffs. Citing international law precedents, rather
than relying solely on U.S. decisions, the Court reversed its earlier rul-
ing and accepted disappearance as a cause of action.'3
In addition to legislative activity, IGO's are creating mechanisms
to monitor disappearances in individual cases and to provide the means
to respond promptly, thus securing the release of disappeared persons
to save lives. The United Nations has devised a useful program in the
Working Group on Forced and Involuntary Disappearances, created in
slavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, politi-
cal, racial, religious, or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities." Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2 & 11, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 150, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1 (1954). See also Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal art. 6(c), in
I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL Nu-
REMBERG 10, 11 (1947).
12. Forti and Benchoam v. Sufrez Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531 (D.Cal. 1987). The Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (1988), provides for federal court jurisdiction for suits on torts for
crimes committed abroad, as long as the acts constitute "crimes against the law of nations." Gen-
eral Carlos Guillermo Surez Mason was the only high-ranking officer in the Argentine Army
who fled Argentina rather than face charges for his role in human rights violations, as the notori-
ous "lord of life and death" in the First Army Corps, which included Buenos Aires, between 1976
and 1978. After living clandestinely for several years, he was arrested in San Francisco in 1987,
and finally extradited to Argentina the following year. He is currently in custody in Argentina,
and the case against him is the only pending prosecution for the crimes of the so-called "dirty
war." While in custody in California, six Argentine citizens (including Alfredo Forti and Dibora
Benchoam) who were in the United States and had been his victims or relatives of his victims,
filed three separate lawsuits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the precedent in FilArtiga v.
Pefia Irala, 630 F.2d. 876 (2d Cir. 1980). All three plaintiffs eventually won default judgments.
13. Forti v. Sudrez Mason, no. C-87-2058-DLJ (N.D. Cal. July 6, 1988), amended 694 F.
Supp. 707 (1988). Amnesty International - USA filed an amicus brief on December 16, 1987
supporting the proposition that disappearances are internationally recognized as a violation of
international law and as a "crime against humanity." Sudrez Mason was ultimately sentenced to
pay more than $80 million in damages to the plaintiffs in this and in the other two related
lawsuits.
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1980 by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC). With staff support provided by the U.N.
Center for Human Rights based in Geneva, Switzerland, the Working
Group receives complaints, addresses governments, conducts on-site vis-
its and publishes periodic reports.14
The NGO community has long attempted to push a Convention on
Disappearances through the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.15 Al-
though this attempt appears stalled, an effort to enact a declaration
seems to be gathering momentum." A convention is a multi-lateral
treaty binding on the States that sign and ratify it. A declaration is a
non-binding statement by the international community. The content of
declarations, however, is sometimes considered evidence that the inter-
national community has recognized that some standard has become
customary international law. The U.N. General Assembly has had oc-
casion to issue declarations on disappearances. 7
C. Actions at the Regional Level
In the Americas, disappearances generated important activity by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("Commission"), a
body of the Organization of American States created in 1959. During
the 1970s the staff of the Commission was flooded with complaints and
urgent appeals on behalf of desaparecidos from several countries. In
response, the Commission opened numerous case files and processed the
complaints in accordance with the Convention's procedures. It also de-
veloped a system of immediate urgent action. for cases where a recent
arrest had yet to be acknowledged: the Commission staff in Washing-
ton, D.C. would issue urgent appeals by telegram, by telephone and by
letter, directed at the foreign ministries or at the diplomatic representa-
tion of each country before the OAS. In many well-known cases, this
14. The Working Group was created by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights by Res. 20
(XXXVI), February 1980. It presents annual reports to the Commission. See Report of the Work-
ing Group, supra note 9, at 1, para. 1.
15. See Colloquium, supra note 10; LA DESAPARICi6N, supra note 6.
16. The U.N. Working Group on Detention is drafting such a Declaration in cooperation
with the Working Group on Disappearances and several "experts" drawn from the NGO commu-
nity. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sessional Working Group on Detentions, Draft Decla-
ration on the Protection of all Persons Against Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1989/WG.I/WP.6 (August 22, 1989).
17. Resolution of December 20, 1978, adopted without a vote, A/Res-33/173); Res.40/147,
December 13, 1985; Res. 41/145, December 4, 1986. See also Velhsquez, supra note 4, at para.
16 (Observations of the Commission on the Preliminary Objection of the Government of Hondu-
ras, March 20, 1987).
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procedure resulted in an acknowledgement of the detention, or in the
quiet release of the victim.
The Commission simultaneously devoted considerable attention to
disappearances in the context of on-site missions to countries where the
practice was in effect. The Commission delegation issued public an-
nouncements of its interest on the matter and received testimony from
numerous persons seeking information on the fate and whereabouts of
their loved ones. The delegation would also request information on spe-
cific cases from governmental authorities and would insist on inspecting
prisons and detention sites that were thought to hold desaparecidos.
These highly publicized on-site visits had the effect of forcing the
release or "legalization" of some prisoners. As a result, the pace of
disappearances slowed, or the system halted altogether. At the same
time a national awareness of the problem made disappearances more
complicated after the Commission mission left the country.
The Commission's reports on individual countries regarding disap-
pearances are the high mark of that body's work over the years.'"
These reports are important not only to document specific cases of dis-
appearances, but they also establish evidence of governmental responsi-
bility, as well as to help define and describe the practice. The Commis-
sion engaged the Inter-American community of nations by raising
concern about the proliferation of disappearances. At the request of the
Commission, the General Assembly of the OAS called disappearances
''a crime against humanity" and "an affront to the conscience of the
hemisphere." 19 General Assembly resolutions instructed the Commis-
sion to work on specific aspects of the problem, and to draft instru-
ments to outlaw it. In 1988, the Commission published a special report
on disappeared children, which was presented to the General Assembly
in November of that year.2 0 The Commission drafted a Convention on
Disappearances, which has been widely debated - and generally sup-
ported - by the NGO community. The 1988 General Assembly con-
sidered this draft, and submitted it to the Commission on Legal and
Political Affairs in order to receive comments from member States. At
the 1989 General Assembly the delegates decided to keep the process
18. Commission, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, OAS Doc. OEA/
ser.L/V/ll.66, doec.17 (1985); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, OAS
Doc. OEA/ser.L./V/Il.46, doc. 23 rev. 1 (1978); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Argentina, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.L/V/II.49, doc. 19 (1980).
19. OAS G.A. Res. 666 (XI11-0/83) (November 18, 1983); later, the OAS General Assem-
bly ratified the notion that disappearances constitute a "crime against humanity." Res. 742 (XIV-
0/84) (November 17, 1984).
20. See Commission's Annual Report 1987-88, supra note 10, at 331.
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open for further comments. To date, only four countries have submitted
comments, and there appears to be little interest in moving ahead.21
In 1986, a major breakthrough was achieved when the Commis-
sion decided to try a different strategy: in three cases of disappearances
involving two Honduran and two Costa Rican citizens, the Commission
found the Government of Honduras responsible for violations of the
Convention and submitted the cases to the Court under the latter's con-
tentious jurisdiction. Precipitating this strategy were the approximately
140 disappearances between 1981 and 1984 in Honduras under a plan
devised by General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, then Commander of the
Armed Forces."
Angel Manfredo Velhsquez, a married Honduran student and la-
bor activist with three children, was abducted while driving his car in
downtown Tegucigalpa on September 12, 1981. Eyewitnesses told his
family that he was forcibly placed in a small van in a parking lot and
driven away. Saul Godinez Cruz, a high school teacher and activist in
the teachers' union, married with one daughter, was abducted in his
home town of Choluteca, on July 22, 1982 when he was intercepted on
his motorcycle as he left town for classes in a neighboring city. His
captors included at least one uniformed soldier, according to one eye-
witness. Francisco Fair6n Garbi and Yolanda Solis Corrales, both
Costa Rican citizens, were students and worked full time. They left
San Jos6 on December 8, 1981, according to relatives, on a vacation
that would have taken them to Mexico. When no news came from ei-
ther of them by Christmas, their families initiated contacts with con-
sulates and issued public requests for information about them. The
Nicaraguan consular offices promptly responded that border post
records showed that they had entered Nicaragua on the day of their
departure and left for Honduras on December 11, 1981. At first Hon-
duras denied that they had ever entered Honduran territory, as did
Guatemala and El Salvador. In late December, the Fair6n family re-
ceived an issue of a Tegucigalpa newspaper with a photograph of a
slain young man. The caption said that police had reported that the
man was an unidentified guerrilla who had died in an "armed confron-
tation" with police. The photograph bore a striking resemblance to
Fair6n Garbi.
With the active support of the Costa Rican government, Francisco
21. Id.
22. See Americas Watch, Human Rights in Honduras: Signs of the Argentine Method
(1982).
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Fairgn Almengor, father of the victim, travelled to Honduras in Janu-
ary 1982 looking for information. He discovered that the remains of
the young man were buried, but an autopsy had been performed which
revealed that he had been shot execution-style, while kneeling and
hand-cuffed. He also discovered that this and other human remains had
been located in a desolate area called La Montaflita, not far from Te-
gucigalpa. At the request of the Costa Rican authorities, the President
of Honduras promised an investigation, including an exhumation of the
"corpse of La Montaiita" to permit comparison with pre-mortem den-
tal records of Fair6n Garbi.
Such an exhumation never took place despite the initial insistence
of Costa Rica, and later the repeated requests by the Commission. In
late January, Guatemalan authorities changed their response and
claimed that Fair6n and Solis had entered Guatemala on December 12,
less than twenty-four hours after they crossed the Nicaragua-Honduras
border, and had left for El Salvador on December 14. After this new
information emerged, Honduras announced that its immigration
records indicated that the two young persons had entered Honduras
and left for Guatemala. El Salvador continued to insist that they had
never entered its territory. Costa Rican authorities and the families of
both victims remained convinced that they "disappeared" in Honduras,
though there were no eyewitnesses to an arrest, nor a specific date or
place in which it happened.
At different dates in 1982, the Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights in Honduras (CODEH), a non-governmental group
based in Tegucigalpa, filed complaints with the Commission, charging
Honduras with responsibility for the abductions. After processing these
and other cases on Honduras for several years, the Commission submit-
ted these three cases to the Court, presumably because they were the
most advanced in the process and had the best potential for the devel-
opment of evidence. From 1979 until 1986, the Court had exercised
only its advisory jurisdiction. 3 These cases, which were tried as one by
the Court, became the first - and so far only - exercise of the
Court's contentious jurisdiction. It is highly significant that the first
international-law trial under this mechanism involved the practice that
has been most distinctive of repression in Latin America in recent
years.
23. See below for a description of the Court's two forms of jurisdiction and for the Commis-
sion's role in each.
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION
The bodies responsible for the protection of fundamental freedoms
in the Inter-American system are the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. Both
bodies are empowered by the American Convention on Human Rights
to protect and promote human rights. The Commission is also empow-
ered to monitor human rights according to the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man.2" This last instrument is technically a
"recommendation," 2 but has gained enforceability in practice and is
applied by the Commission to OAS member states which have not rati-
fied the Convention.2" Nevertheless, today the legal elements under
both the Convention and the Declaration are basically the same."7 The
Commission may seek a settlement in a case involving State Parties to
the Convention or, in the alternative, refer a case to the Court if it
involves a State that has recognized the Court's jurisdiction.2"
A. The Commission
The Commission is an autonomous entity of the OAS whose prin-
cipal function is to promote the observance and defense of human
rights and to serve as an advisory body to the OAS.29 It is a quasi-
24. Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/
ser.L.V./Il.71, doc. 6 rev. I, at 17 (1987) [hereinafter "Declaration"]; see Buergenthal, The In-
ter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 470 (Meron ed. 1984). For a discussion of different issues on the
Inter-American system, see generally OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, DER-
ECHOS HUMANOS EN LAS AMERICAS, HOMENAJE A LA MEMORIA DE CARLOS A. DUNSHEE DE
ABRANCHES (HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS, HOMAGE TO THE MEMORY OF CARLOS A. DUN-
SHEE DE ABRANCHES)(1984); LA CONVENCI6N AMERICANA SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS (OAS
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights)(1980).
25. Resolution XXX, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States,
Bogota, Colombia, March 30 - May 2, 1948, at 48 (Pan American Union, 1948).
26. See Farer & Rowles, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 47 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978); Garcia Amador, Atribu-
ciones de la Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en Relacion con los Estados Miem-
bros de la OEA que no son Partes en la Convencion de 1969, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS, supra note 24, at 177; see also P. NIKKEN, LA PROTECCION INTERNACIONAL DE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS: Su DESARROLLO PROGRESIVo 284 (1987)(Instituto Interamericano de Der-
echos Humanos, editorial Civitas, S.A.).
27. These include requirements for admissibility, procedure, rules of evidence and charac-
teristics of the resolutions of the Commission.
28. See P. NIKKEN, supra note 26, at 303-08.
29. Article I, Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organiza-
tion of American States, June 29, 1987. See Buergenthal, supra note 24, at 452-54.
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judicial body with legal, diplomatic and political powers, established in
1959 by Resolution VI of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, Chile. a" Since its creation, the
Commission has been the subject of reforms intended to broaden its
powers.31
The most important legal reform affecting the work of the Com-
mission occurred in 1969 with the adoption of the Convention. 2 Today,
the majority of OAS member states have become State Parties to the
Convention. 3 The Convention, unlike the Declaration, is an interna-
tional treaty. It established a sophisticated procedure for individual pe-
titions, similiar to its European counterpart and, more significantly, es-
tablished the Court.3 4
The Commission and the Court, according to the Convention, are
each made up of seven experts in the human rights field, elected in
their individual capacities and not as government representatives. Both
organs include an Executive Secretariat whose function is to support
members in the performance of their duties.35
The Commission's members 6 are elected by the General Assem-
bly's member states, independent of their ratification of the Conven-
tion.37 Only State Parties to the Convention, however, may elect mem-
30. For a good overview of the evolution of the Commission and its principal legal chal-
lenges since its creation, see C. MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS, SYS-
TEMATIC VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1988).
31. The Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1965 required the
Commission to examine individual denunciations of alleged human rights violations and to submit
an annual report to the Inter-American Conference or Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In
1967 the Commission became a principal organ of the OAS as a result of an amendment (Article
51) to the Charter of the Organization (Protocol of Buenos Aires).
32. The Convention, or Pacto de San Jose was signed in San Jose, Costa Rica, on Novem-
ber 22, 1969 and entered into force on July 18, 1978 with the requisite eleven OAS member state
ratifications.
33. The United States, Brazil, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua
and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Bahamas have all not ratified the Con-
vention. Informe Anual de la Comisibn Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1988-89, OEA, 18
septiembre 1989, pag. 6.
34. See Articles 25-55 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The European Convention and other important human rights instruments
are reproduced in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES
AND MATERIALS (1987).
35. Article 13, Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Article
10, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
36. They are not required to be attorneys. However, they must be persons of high moral
character, with a recognized level of competence in the field of human rights. Article 34 of the
American Convention on Human Rights.
37. Id. Article 36.
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bers of the Court. In contrast to Commission members, the Court's
judges should be jurists and nationals of the member states of the
OAS.38
The Commission has three primary functions: processing individ-
ual complaints of alleged human rights violations; preparing reports on
human rights situations in OAS member states; and proposing mea-
sures to be taken by the OAS to increase respect for human rights in
the region.39
1. Processing Individual Complaints
Individuals may petition the Commission directly or through rep-
resentatives, with complaints based upon alleged violations of the Con-
vention. Similarly, NGOs can file petitions on behalf of individuals for
alleged violations of the Convention.4" By contrast, the European Con-
vention only allows petitions from those individuals who claim to have
had their fundamental rights violated.4' When the Commission receives
a petition, it may solicit information from the State concerned, which
has the obligation to cooperate with the proceeding. ' 2 In serious and
urgent cases, the Commission, with the consent of the State involved,
may carry out an independent, on site, fact-finding investigation.43 In
serious cases the Commission may also request the State to adopt pre-
cautionary measures, a type of preliminary injunction, to avoid irrepa-
rable harm to individuals." The Commission's request for such mea-
sures, however, is without prejudice to the State's interest in the final
38. Judge Thomas Burgenthal, a distinguished American legal scholar, became a member
of the Court on May 22, 1979, nominated by the government of Costa Rica without relevance to
U.S. ratification of the Convention.
39. Article 41 of the Convention. On the subject of the Commission's current powers, see
MEDINA, supra note 30, at 113-56.
40. Since 1965 the Commission has processed over 10,000 petitions; Article 44 of the Con-
vention, Article 26 of the Regulations of the Commission. A detailed examination of the individ-
ual petition procedure may be found in Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-
American System for Protection of Human Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE (H. Hannum ed. 1984).
41. Article 25 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
42. Article 48, para. l(d) of the Convention.
43. Article 48, para. 2 of the Convention; Article 44, para. 2 of the Rules of the
Commission.
44. This is a very broad power that can be applied to States whether or not they are parties
to the Convention. Frequently, governments ignore the Commission's requests for an individual's
protection. Governments also assure the Commission there is no cause for concern. In a few cases,
local authorities have interviewed the individual and offered him/her "police protection" which
itself would facilitate targeting the individual. Article 29, Article 34, para. 2 of the Regulations of
the Commission.
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disposition of the case."' As part of the precautionary measures, the
Commission may contact the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the
State asking for an urgent reply to the requested, pertinent
information.'
The Commission also has the power to turn to the Court and re-
quest the adoption of provisional measures when the State involved has
ratified the Convention.' 7 The Commission can exercise this power even
in matters not yet submitted to the Court, although so far it has never
used this power.48 This preliminasry injunction requested by the Com-
mission appears to be the final recourse available within the Inter-
American system to prevent irreparable harm to individuals.
For the Commission to admit a petition, the request must satisfy
certain minimal, formal requirements such as the identification of the
person or NGO filing the complaint; a description of the facts sur-
rounding the alleged violation(s); the State allegedly responsible; the
specific rights of the Convention that were allegedly violated; and the
exhaustion of domestic remedies. 49 In situations where the State con-
cerned does not afford due process, or the petitioner does not have ac-
cess to, or is prevented from exhausting the applicable domestic reme-
dies, or there is an unjustified delay in rendering a final judgment, the
requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted is waived.50
A petitioner must file his or her claim no more than six months
after notification of the final disposition in a domestic case which repre-
sents the exhaustion of remedies. However, the Commission has the
flexibility to accept or deny petitions, setting aside statutory limitations,
by taking into account the particular circumstances of a case.51 During
45. Article 29, para. 4 of the the Regulations of the Commission.
46. Article 34, para. 2 of the Regulations of the Commission.
47. Article 63, para. 2 of the Convention; Article 76 of the Regulations of the Commission;
Article 23, para. 2 of the Regulations of the Court. According to Judge Buergenthal, the Court
can adopt provisional measures only in matters where it involves a State Party to the Convention
that has accepted its jurisdiction, or where a State Party to the Convention accepts temporary
jurisdiction in response to a request by the Commission or the Court. See Buergenthal, supra note
24, at 465-66.
48. When witnesses in the Honduran cases were murdered, the Commission, as a precau-
tionary measure (invoking Article 29 of its Regulations) sent a message to the Honduran govern-
ment requesting a full investigation and protection for other witnesses. Separately, the Court,
using its own powers adopted interim measures with regard to the same incident. Article 23 para.
I of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. See infra, Section VII, Protection of Witnesses.
49. Article 32 of the Regulations of the Commission.
50. Article 37 of the Regulations of the Commission.
51. Article 38, para. I of the Regulations of the Commission. "The six month deadline for
petitioners to file a complaint has held little practical importance for the Commission." D.
O'DONNELL, PROTECCION INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOs 441 (1988). Nonetheless
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the preliminary objections in Fairen-Solis, the Commission restated its
flexible policy regarding the issue of time.5"
Petition processing may be characterized as adversarial, since a
bilateral discussion occurs between the petitioner (individual or NGO)
and the accused State. In this investigative phase, the Commission
plays a passive role, mediating the discussion between the parties. 51 It
acts as carrier and investigator soliciting responses to the petitioner's
claims from the State, and transmitting information between the par-
ties. In overseeing the exchange, the Commission limits the response
time available to each party. 4
The Commission is interested in promoting a fluid discussion be-
tween the parties concerned; the discussion will provide the Commis-
sion with the information required to adopt a resolution. In some cases,
communication is only a formality. For example, a State may respond
so generally to specific points in an individual's complaint that the
Commission, ex officio or at the petitioner's request, may submit a sep-
arate questionnaire about controversial or confusing points in the com-
plaint which have not been clarified by the State in its response. In
such a manner, the Commission not only reestablishes communication
between the parties, but clarifies relevant issues and improves its own
record of information in order to form an opinion of the case.55
Where a State completely fails to cooperate, the Commission may
issue a warning that it intends to apply Article 42 of its Regulations,
which establishes a presumption of truth regarding pertinent facts in
favor of the petitioner. This Article is an original creation of the Com-
mission and represents the "last resort," intended to persuade the State
to cooperate with the Commission. It has also been perceived as a sanc-
tion against a State's insensitivity or unwillingness to work with the
Commission.56 The Commission, however, must use this provision
the Commission will require the filing of a petition within a reasonable time.
52. See Fairn Garbi and Soils Corrales, Case 7951, Observations of the Commission,
March 20, 1987, at 52.
53. The Commission's behavior is often too passive in this stage, and if the petitioner does
not understand his or her crucial active role, the case could be paralyzed because of inaction.
Article 48, para. 1(b) of the Convention. Therefore, in practice the responsibility for expediting a
case rests with the petitioner, who must be in constant contact with the Commission staff member
in charge of the case.
54. Articles 34.5, 34.6 & 34.7 of the Regulations of the Commission. In practice, the Com-
mission permits this dialogue between the parties to continue even beyond its own regulations until
it considers that the case is "ripe" enough for a final resolution.
55. Articles 34 & 35 of the Regulations of the Commission.
56. Aguilar, Procedimiento que Debe Aplicar la Comisibn Interamericana de Derechos
lH-manos en el Examen de las Peticiones o Comunicaciones Individuales sobre Presuntas Viola-
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prudently.
Dialogue with the State increases the Commission's sources of in-
formation, even where there exist varying degrees of State cooperation.
The Commission must also maximize its sources of information and
base its decisions on detailed and rigorous analysis of all available evi-
dence. Indeed, resolutions based exclusively on Article 42's presump-
tion often damage the weight of a pertinent case.
The Commission has been extraordinarily flexible and informal
with regard to rules of evidence. It has permitted the admission of affi-
davits, videotaped testimonies, personal documents, newspaper clip-
pings, and technical expert testimony, viewing broadly what might
serve as evidence.
During the initial investigative period, the petitioner plays a fun-
damental role. If the petitioner so chooses, he or she may appear in a
private hearing during the Commission's sessions personally, or through
a representative, to explain his or her version of the alleged facts and
present relevant evidence.57
During its annual meetings, the Commission, on its own initiative
or at the request of either of the parties, may offer to mediate a
friendly settlement of the case.58 This procedure may be used only if in
the Commission's judgment the alleged facts are sufficiently precise
and the nature of the case is susceptible to the use of the friendly set-
tlement mechanism.5 9 In any case, all settlements must be based on the
respect for human rights recognized in the Convention.60
Finally, if the Commission believes that a State has violated any of
the rights protected under the Convention or Declaration, it may ap-
prove a resolution condemning the State as well as make certain rec-
ommendations. If the State does not adopt the Commission's recom-
mendations or provide new facts or invoke additional legal arguments
within a ninety day period, the Commission may then publish the reso-
lution in its Annual Report which is submitted to the General Assem-
bly." l For State Parties to the Convention that have accepted the con-
ciones de Derechos Humanos, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 24, at 211.
57. Should the circumstances require, a hearing before the Commission during its Period of
Sessions is perhaps the most timely opportunity to request an on-site investigation by the Commis-
sion or a special mission by the attorney of the Secretariat in charge of the cases in petitioner's
country. See Articles 15, 28 and 67 of the Regulations of the Commission.
58. Article 45, para. I of the Regulations of the Commission.
59. Id. para. 2.
60. Id.; see also Godinez Judgment INTER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 3 paras. 45-49
(1987)(Judgment on Preliminary Objections).
61. Articles 51-54 of the Regulations of the Commission.
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tentious jurisdiction of the Court, the Commission is empowered to
submit a case to the Court. Yet the Commission has exercised this
power only once. 2 On two other occasions, the Commission unsuccess-
fully called upon State Parties to the Convention to recognize the
Court's jurisdiction in resolving specific cases.63
2. Preparing Reports on Human Rights
As a consequence of the Commission's own initiative" or by invi-
tation from a particular State, the Commission conducts on-site investi-
gations from which it usually prepares reports on the situation of
human rights in that specific State. 5 The request for a mission by the
Commission can also be made by a political body of the OAS, such as
the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers.66 All visits con-
ducted by the Commission for the purpose of reporting on human
rights conditions in a country require the prior consent of the State
concerned. 67 Obviously, the weight of the Commission's investigation is
stronger when it has access to sources of information through direct
contact in the field.
The on-site investigations 6 of the Commission and the special
62. On April 24, 1986 the Commission submitted the first contentious cases to the Court:
Manfredo Velizsquez Rodriguez, Case 7920; Saul Godinez Cruz, Case 8097; Francisco Fairbn
Garbi and Yolanda Solis Corrales, Case 7951.
63. Article 62, para. 2 of the Convention; Article 50, para. 3 of the Regulations of the
Commission; see Edgar Macias, Case 9102, Res. no. 29/86 against Nicaragua; Hugo Spadafora,
Case 9726, Res. no. 25/87 against Panama. See cases cited supra note 4.
64. See Godinez Preliminary Judgment, at paras. 50-58.
65. During the last fifteen years, the Commission has prepared country reports on human
rights in the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname and Uruguay.
66. See Vargas, Las Observaciones In Loco Practicadas Por La Comisibn Interamericana
de Derechos Humanos, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 24, at 290. It is notewor-
thy that a second visit to Panama was carried out by the Commission in response to a request by
the President of the Twenty-First Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers for the purpose of
"completing and updating the information on the situation of human rights in that country," in
August 24, 1989. As a result of its visits to Panama, the Commission published a special report on
Panama. See OEA/ser.L./V/II.76, doc.16 rev.2 (1989).
67. Article 48, para. 2 of the Convention; Article 44, paras. 55-62 of the Regulations of the
Commission.
68. In loco visits are local, on-site investigations by the Commission where it has the chance
to make personal contact with local government officials and human rights NGOs, and directly
receive testimony from victims or witnesses in the cases. In summary, the Commission has the
opportunity to observe the general human rights conditions and political climate in the country.
Some of the states in which the Commission has conducted visits in loco are: Argentina, Chile, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. References to important on-site inves-
tigations by the Commission in the early 1980s are contained in Norris, Observations in loco:
Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1979-83, 19 TEX.
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country reports which may follow have been extraordinarily effective in
the defense of human rights, particularly during the 1970s and early
1980s when military regimes were numerous in Latin America.
The country reports, for example, have helped the Inter-American
system of human rights protection to confront gross and massive
human rights violations in the region, even in those countries where the
Commission was denied government consent to conduct an on-site in-
vestigation.69 Country reports, however, are an indirect channel of pro-
tection against abuse. The reports are strongest in their capacity to ex-
pose and denounce human rights violations. Through the publication of
its country reports, the Commission can alert the domestic and interna-
tional community (particularly for debates during the General Assem-
bly of the OAS) to the unacceptable behavior of States or to a particu-
lar phenomenon, such as the practice of disappearances or extrajudicial
executions. These publications have the salutary effect of provoking
strong reaction from democratic governments, the public, the media,
NGOs and other political actors.
The best instrument for human rights protection in Latin America
is the effective and persistent processing of individual cases by the
Commission. As more elected civilian governments take power in Latin
America and recognize the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, indi-
vidual petitions may be pursued more aggressively. One of the most
significant challenges for the Commission today is to apply the high
standards delineated in its human rights reports over the past 15 years
to individual cases brought to its attention.
3. Proposing Measures for the OAS
Through the Annual Reports it submits to the OAS General As-
sembly, the Commission also focuses on the promotion of human rights
and the steps necessary toward a full observance of the rights set forth
in the Declaration and the Convention. These include the draft of the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (submitted
in 1978 and signed in Colombia on December 9, 1985), the draft of the
INT'L L.J. 285 (1984).
69. The Commission has not carried out a visit in loco in Chile since 1974 because of the
Chilean government's denial of consent; however, the Commission has produced four reports on
the situation of human rights in Chile since that time. On the other hand, the. Paraguayan govern-
ment granted its consent to a visit in loco in 1978, only to renege on its invitation because it was
unable to set an appropriate date. After twelve years, in 1990 Paraguay permitted the Commis-
sion to visit the country. This maneuver by the Paraguayan government, however, did not prevent
the Commission from publishing two special reports on the human rights situation in Paraguay.
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Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
Relevant to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (submitted in 1986
and signed in El Salvador on November 17, 1988) and the draft of the
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (sub-
mitted in 1988). The Commission has also submitted specific proposals
to the General Assembly on such issues as the independence of the ju-
diciary, refugee rights, and the rights of indigenous populations.
B. The Court
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an autonomous ju-
dicial institution of the Inter-American system. The Court's purpose is
to apply and interpret the Convention.70 The Court was established in
1979, after the Convention entered into force.7
1. Advisory Jurisdiction
The Convention confers on the Court two distinct judicial func-
tions: advisory jurisdiction and contentious jurisdiction. Cases adjudi-
cated under contentious jurisdiction are binding upon State Parties to
the Convention, those under advisory jurisdiction are not.7 The Court
also has the special jurisdiction to adopt provisional measures in certain
matters, at the request of the Commission.
The Court's advisory jurisdiction is very broad: it allows the Court
to interpret the Convention as well as other treaties on the protection of
human rights in the member States and to examine the compatibility
of domestic law with those instruments.7
Advisory opinions may be requested by all OAS member states,
regardless of whether they have ratified the Convention, and by perma-
nent organs of the OAS, such as the Commission, in matters relating to
70. Article I of the Statute of the Court.
71. Edmundo Vargas, Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, explained the bakground and legal efforts that preceded the creation of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court. Vargas, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, in PERSPECTIVAS DEL DER-
ECHO INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORANEO: EXPERIENCIA Y VISION DE AMERICA LATINA 129 (Vol.
11 Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Santiago, Chile 1981); see also Zovatto, Antecedentes de
la Creacibn de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos in LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS, ESTUDIOS Y DOCUMENTOS 207 (IIDH 1985).
72. See Interpretation of Peace Treaties, I.C.J. Reports, Opinion 30 (111) 50, 71-72 (1950).
73. Article 64 para. I of the Convention; Advisory Opinion on "Other Treaties" Subject to
the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court, INTER-AM. CT.H.R.(ser. A) para. I (1982); Buergenthal,
The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 27
(1985).
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their functions."4
In the last ten years, the Court has issued ten advisory opinions
with varying effect.7 5 For example, an advisory opinion reaffirming re-
strictions to the death penalty as established in Article 4 of the Con-
vention 76 was particularly effective in stopping a State Party which re-
served its ratification of the Convention on this article. Guatemala
ceased its practice of executing individuals allegedly involved in com-
mon crimes related to political offenses shortly before the Court issued
its opinion. 7 Equally significant was the Court's opinion establishing
the principle that even under states of emergency, the writ of habeas
corpus could not be suspended as an essential judicial guarantee for the
protection of individual rights.78
The government of Nicaragua, which had previously suspended
habeas corpus during states of emergency, halted this policy coinciden-
tally following the Court's opinions. On the other hand, the Panama-
nian government, even after several pleas by the Commission to stop,
continued to suspend habeas corpus during states of emergency without
any acknowledgement of the Commission's requests. 79
2. Contentious Jurisdiction
Under its contentious jurisdiction, the Court has binding authority
to consider and decide cases concerning the interpretation and applica-
74. Article 64 para. 2 of the Convention.
75. Of those opinions, the Commission has requested three. State Parties that requested
advisory opinions by the Court include: Peru, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Colombia. For a detailed
examination on the exercise of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court, see generally M. Ventura &
D. Zovatto, LA FUNcI6N CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DEREcHos HUMANOS
1982-1987 (IIDH 1989).
76. "In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related common
crimes." Article 4 para. 4 of the Convention; see also Article 4 para. 2 of the Convention.
77. Lockwood, Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 13 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 245-67 (1984); Moyer & Padilla, Executions in Guatemala as Decreed by
Court of Special Jurisdiction in 1982-82: A Case Study, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 507 (1984); Bu-
ergenthal, The Inter-American Court, Human Rights and the OAS, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 157-64
(1986).
78. The suspension of habeas corpus is prohibited by the Convention. INTER-AM. Cr.H.R.,
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27 para. 2; 25 para. 1; and 7 para. 6 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987, series
A, no. 8.
79. Under Article 51 of the Panamanian Constitution, habeas corpus may be suspended
under states of emergency. During 1987-89, Panamanian authorities declared states of emergency
on several different occasions, suspending habeas corpus. See Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (OAS), Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, OEA/ser.L./V./
11.76, at 9-13 (1989).
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tion of the Convention. Upon a finding of violation of the Convention
by a State Party, the Court may decide that an injured party must be
guaranteed the exercise of his or her violated right and, if appropriate,
order the payment of fair compensation.8"
Only State Parties with prior recognition of the Court's jurisdic-
tion, or that recognize jurisdiction for a particular case, and the Com-
mission may submit cases to the Court.8 Nineteen OAS member states
have ratified the Convention, ten of which have recognized the conten-
tious jurisdiction of the Court.82 The Commission has unsuccessfully
requested State Parties that have not recognized the Court's jurisdic-
tion to accept it in particular cases.8
Judgments of the Court are final and not subject to appeal. A
judgment for compensatory damages may be executed in the country
concerned in accordance with domestic procedures. However, in cases
of disagreement over the meaning or scope of a judgment, parties must
request a clarification from the Court within ninety days after notifica-
tion of the judgment.8
In situations of non-compliance by States with Court judgments or
recommendations, the Court may submit such cases for review to a
regular session of the General Assembly or to the Permanent Council
when the Assembly is not in session.88
In 1981 the Costa Rican government directly submitted a case
against itself to the Court, bypassing the Commission process. Two
years later, the Court dismissed the case holding that a State cannot
waive the proceedings before the Commission.8" The Costa Rican sub-
80. Article 63 para. I of the Convention.
81. Article 61 para. I of the Convention.
82. To date, State Parties that have recognized the Court's jurisdiction in conformity with
Article 62 of the Convention include: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. OEA/ser. A/16, no. 36, Treaty Series. Some
countries (e.g. Argentina in 1984, Colombia in 1985, and Guatemala in 1987) have limited the
Court's jurisdiction to violations that occur after the date of acceptance. See Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, supra note 24; see also Governmental
Liability for 'Disappearances': A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, supra note 5, at 296.
83. See supra cases cited in note 63.
84. Articles 67, 68 of the Convention. Currently, the judgments for compensatory damages
in Velibsquez and Godinez have been presented to the Court for clarification. See infra Section
VIII (Damages).
85. Article 65 of the Convention; see Buergenthal, supra note 24, at 467.
86. The case involved a Costa Rican woman who was killed by a member of the civil guard
while imprisoned. Costa Rica waived the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and
agreed to be bound by the Court's ruling. In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., INTER-AM.
CT.H.R. (ser. A) No. G 101/81.
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mission was the closest that the Court came to exercising its conten-
tious jurisdiction until 1986 when the Court received its first conten-
tious cases, submitted by the Commission regarding disappearances in
Honduras.
IV. THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
CASE AGAINST HONDURAS
A. Institutional Cooperation
From the beginning, private human rights organizations were in-
volved in bringing these cases and pushing them through the proceed-
ings. In the Velasquez and Godinez cases, the initial complaints before
the Commission were filed in 1981 and 1982 by the Comit para la
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Honduras (CODEH),8 7 that
country's foremost civil institution dedicated to monitoring human
rights. In the subsequent proceedings before the Commission, CODEH
and its chairman, Dr. Ram6n Custodio L6pez, presented new evidence,
appeared in person at hearings in Washington D.C., responded to
presentations by the Honduran government and submitted legal argu-
ments. At some points CODEH was joined by the relatives of the vic-
tims, as well as by institutions of which those relatives were members:
the Honduran Comit de Familiares de Desaparecidos (COFADEH) 88
and the San Jos6-based Asociacibn Centro-Americana de Familiares
de Desaparecidos (ACAFADE). s9
In 1986, when the original complainants were advised of the sub-
mission of the cases to the Court, they decided to form a legal team to
represent them through the newly opened stages. Attorneys and profes-
sors of international law were contacted in the United States, Hondu-
ras and Costa Rica. Most proceedings took place in Washington, D.C.
and in San Jos6, Costa Rica and not only demanded considerable per-
sonal time by attorneys offering their services pro bono publico, but
also important institutional support. For that reason, the team which
finally represented the interests of the relatives included Professor
Claudio Grossman and the authors of this article, all based in Wash-
ington, D.C., and Mr. Hugo Mufioz Quesada, of San Jos6.9 ° Several
87. In Fairkn-Solls, Mr. Francisco Fair6n Almengor filed the complaint before the
Commission.
88. Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared in Honduras.
89. Central-American Association of Relatives of the Disappeared.
90. Professor Grossman is the Director of International Legal Studies at the Washington
College of Law, The American University, and a member of the Executive Committee of the
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distinguished Honduran lawyers provided important assistance in do-
mestic law and fact development; however, intense governmental and
public pressure including threats and intimidation prevented them from
joining the team in any formal capacity.
A major effort was needed from the start to coordinate the tasks of
the complainants, the relatives and the lawyers, as well as to decide
appropriate legal strategies, to obtain and develop evidence in at least
four different countries, and to find and persuade witnesses to testify.
Neither the Court nor the Commission provided funding for travel by
witnesses or lawyers to attend hearings. Trips by lawyers to look for
evidence in Honduras and Guatemala also had to be financed privately.
Raising funds independently became necessary to defray the costs of
attending at least six hearings in San Jos6, including travel by seven-
teen witnesses from different countries. ACAFADE and Americas
Watch provided all of the funds through generous contributions by
foundations in the United States and in Europe. 1
B. Individual Participation in the Honduras Cases
The struggle for justice in human rights requires individuals and
NGOs alike to carve out a separate-space for themselves. In Latin
America, the Inter-American system presents a formal arena for
human rights protection, yet one in which individuals and NGOs are
still fighting to become autonomous and principal actors.9"
1. The First Important Legal Issue: The Victims' Standing
The first issue that the petitioners confronted was to define their
International Human Rights Law Group, a Washington-based NGO. Mr. Vivanco was, in 1986, a
staff attorney for Americas Watch. In 1987 he joined the staff of the Commission and continued
to work in these cases. Mr. M6ndez was then the Director of the Washington office of Americas
Watch, a human rights organization with headquarters in New York. Since 1989, Mr. M6ndez is
the Executive Director of Americas Watch, which in that year became part of Human Rights
Watch. Mr. Mufioz is a former Minister of Justice of Costa Rica.
91. The importance of the issue and the novelty of the process undoubtedly made it rela-
tively easy to raise funds. Nonetheless, litigating the case over more than four years became a
very expensive proposition. The authors feel that important lessons should be drawn, perhaps as
the subject of a future article, on how to develop evidence for future cases.
92. The history of amicus curiae briefs in the Court demonstrates that without its specific
regulations in the Inter-American system, human rights NGOs as well as individuals have been
capable of having a relationship with the Court. See Moyer, The Role of Amicus Curiae in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, La Corte Interamericana, supra note 71; see also Shes-
tack, Sisyphus Endures: The International Human Rights NGO, 24,N.Y.U. L. Rev. 79 ( ); Note,
The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America,
7 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 477 (1977).
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legal standing before the Commission and the Court. While counsel
recognized the limitations they faced within the system, they were also
conscious of their strengths: full-time professional personnel, access to
financial support, and most importantly, direct contact with vital
sources of information - the relatives of the victims and grass-roots or-
ganizations in the region.
The need for an official and institutional liaison with the organs of
the Inter-American system handling the cases became apparent a few
months after the Honduras cases were submitted to the Court in 1986.
Without this link, the opportunity to influence the process would evapo-
rate. The immediate objective was then to establish concrete access to
the system.
Counsel essentially had two main options: to seek independent and
autonomous representation for the relatives of the victims before the
Court, or to secure through the Commission the chance to represent
their interests in a symbiotic relationship with the bodies of the Inter-
American system.
2. European Precedent
Since no precedent on an individual's legal standing existed in the
Inter-American system, counsel turned to the European system of
human rights protection, upon which the Inter-American system is
based, for relevant analogies and guidelines. Although the European
and American systems are similarly restrictive with respect to the indi-
vidual's participation before the Court, the European system allows the
individual to participate directly once proceedings have been initiated
by its Commission or by a State Party.93 European organs have been
extraordinarily creative in contentious matters, gradually lifting the
European Convention's limitations on individual participation.
This progressive, independent participation of the individual before
the European Court began in 1960 with the G.R. Lawless case in
which the European Commission recognized the right of the individual
to participate in the process before the European Court.94 In G.R. Law-
less, the European Commission ordered that all the petitioners be given
access to any relevant information regarding the procedures in order to
93. Article 61 para. I of the Convention and Article 44 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
94. Judgment of November 14, 1960 in the Lawless Case, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 14
(1960-61).
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submit written observations to the European Court.95 While the State
Party argued against such access for the individual, the European
Commission supported it, stating that it had "great doubts as to
whether it may be understood that the authors of the Convention
wished to create such an extreme degree of inequality in the participa-
tion of the two parties in a case before an international tribunal."96
As a result, the European Court affirmed the European Commis-
sion's proposal to allow the participation of individuals, determining
that the practice was necessary for the adequate and timely administra-
tion of justice. The result of the decision meant that the European
Commission could communicate freely and expeditously with petition-
ers, giving petitioners an opportunity to express themselves. Individual
petitioners could also appoint an adviser to work with the European
Commission's delegates in cases before-the European Court.9" In the
Vagrancy case, the European Court further developed its expansion of
individual participation, allowing attorneys for the petitioners to advise
the European Commission on their clients' behalf.98
By 1982 the European Court had developed statutory measures to
include the participation of individuals. Petitioners could be directly in-
volved as soon as proceedings were initiated, designate their advisers,
and intervene in all legal procedures. They were granted rights equal to
those of States and the European Commission in submitting evidence
to the European Court. Today, the participation of the individual be-
gins as soon as the European Court receives a case - it immediately
notifies "the individual, non-governmental organization or group of in-
dividuals that have petitioned" and requests a response within two
weeks from the individual "if s/he wishes to participate in the proceed-
ing pending before the Court." 9
Based on analogous arguments used in the evolution of the Euro-
pean system, counsel in the Honduras cases informed the Commission
of its status as the petitioners' representatives and asked the Commis-
sion to inform the Court of that status.100
95. P. VAN DIKJ & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 142 (1984).
96. Lawless, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B), at 257.
97. Lawless, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser, A), at 14-15.
98. Article 29 of the Rules of the European Court of 1959; Judgment of November 18,
1970 in the Vagrancy Case, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 6-8 (1971).
99. Article 33 of the Rules of the Eur. Ct. H.R., as modified in 1982.
100. Public Hearings of the Commission's Annual Session, September 25, 1986.
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3. Autonomous Standing
As would be available to individual petitioners before the Euro-
pean Court, petitioners requested a right to participate independently
of the Commission's supervision and to have access to all information
related to the proceeding.
When the Commission did not respond, counsel decided to organ-
ize a meeting with all the petitioners. The meeting occurred in San
Jose, Costa Rica in January, 1987, and was the first personal contact
between the families and any of the attorneys in the cases. Counsel
checked important evidence, defined litigation strategies, and most im-
portantly, discussed expectations for the outcome of the cases with the
petitioners.
Following the meeting in Costa Rica, one attorney for the petition-
ers 01 traveled to Honduras in search of evidence for the cases. During
his investigation, he examined more than 100 similar cases and studied
the legal instruments used by the relatives of victims. Specifically,
counsel was able to obtain information regarding the ineffectiveness of
the guarantee of habeas corpus in Honduras. This evidence was critical
in establishing the pattern of disappearances that occurred in Honduras
between 1981 and 1984. Counsel also interviewed Honduran human
rights lawyers, victims of human rights violations, journalists familiar
with the repression in the country, congressmen and activists, some of
whom later testified in the hearings before the Court.
Subsequent to the investigation in Honduras, and after realizing
the. impossibility of obtaining independent status from the Commission,
counsel began working with the Executive Secretary of the Commis-
sion. The attorneys provided technical support to produce a joint docu-
ment with the Commission which responded to the preliminary objec-
tions presented by the Honduran government. In the same document,"'
the Commission notified the Court that some of the representatives of
the petitioners were officially appointed as the Commission's ad hoc
advisers in the cases.
Despite the complexity and controversial process of these first con-
tentious cases, a productive relationship was established between the
Commission and the petitioners' representatives (advisers). Neverthe-
less, at the end of the trial when compensatory damages were to be
determined, disagreement arose over the amount of the compensation
101. Jos6 Miguel Vivanco.
102. On March 20, 1987.
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and the inclusion of punitive damages as part of the compensation. 103
Independent status for petitioners is the best approach for future
contentious cases before the Court. This direct and autonomous partici-
pation will also strengthen the effectiveness of the Inter-American sys-
tem for the protection of human rights. In Europe, greater individual
participation has become increasingly possible because both the Euro-
pean Commission and the Court were willing to interpret the European
system ideally, recognizing that the principal purpose of such institu-
tions is to protect the rights of individuals, offer an independent and
balanced procedural opportunity, and permit the direct confrontation of
interests (State and individual) without third party interference.
V. THE TRIAL
A. Initial Motions
As submitted by the Commission, the three cases consisted mainly
of the exchange of correspondence between the complainants, the Gov-
ernment of Honduras and the Commission. The Government of Hondu-
ras simply denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of the missing
persons and in effect refused to investigate the matter at all. The com-
plainants showed that they had tried to use applications for habeas
corpus, criminal complaints and administrative inquiries to determine
what had happened to the victims - all to no avail. The Commission
had ruled that Honduras was responsible for the disappearances,
mostly on the circumstantial evidence submitted by the complainants
and on Honduras' evident lack of cooperation. 10 The Court asked Hon-
duras to reply, which it did, challenging the Commission's decision to
submit the cases to the Court and asserting that the Court lacked juris-
diction. 10 5 The Commission responded by submitting it's observations
which constituted the Commission's comprehensive statement of the
case.10o
103. See infra Section VIII(C) for a discussion of punitive damages.
104. Commission Resolution of April 24, 1986 (cited in Godinez Judgment, at paras. 1-12).
The Commission applied Article 42 of its Regulations and presumed the truth of the allegations
against Honduras on the ground of its lack of cooperation with the system. The Commission found
Honduras guilty first in 1983, and then in 1986 confirmed the same resolution.
105. Honduras brief ("Memoria") of October 31, 1986 (cited in Velasquez Judgment, at
para. 16).
106. Observations of the Commission to the Brief filed by the Government of Honduras.
See Velbsquez Judgment, INTER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988); Godinez Judgment, INTER-
AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 5 (1989); FairMn Garbi and Solis Corrales Judgment, INTER-AM.
CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
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The Observations brief was prepared by the Commission staff in
cooperation with the relatives' lawyers. The brief presented the Com-
mission's theory of the case: that these three cases manifested a delib-
erate, government-inspired and executed plan to use forced disappear-
ances as a tool to control and suppress a certain segment of political
opponents. The plan further included a deliberate decision to prevent
the normal functioning of Honduras' judicial institutions and other
guarantees for the protection of individual rights. The brief offered to
prove the existence of this plan, as well as specific evidence pertaining
to each case with the testimonies of witnesses that included Honduran
human rights activists, survivors of the campaign of disappearances,
and relatives of the disappeared. Other witnesses included in the proffer
of evidence were Honduran, Guatemalan and Costa Rican government
officials. The Observaciones brief also described the process followed by
the Commission to address the specific complaints and defended the
legality of the decisions adopted by the Commission, including the deci-
sion to seek the Court's involvement. The brief also notified the Court
that the Commission would be represented by a delegation which in-
cluded the lawyers for the families as ad hoc advisers.
B. Preliminary Objections
On the basis of these briefs, the Court decided that a controversy
existed in regard to jurisdiction and treated the Honduras brief, in
part, as the presentation of preliminary objections. Consequently, the
Court scheduled a hearing on preliminary objections. 107
The Honduran Government, represented by a delegation of law-
yers from different branches of government, was led by the Honduran
Ambassador to Costa Rica. The Commission's delegation was led by
the Chair of the Commission, Ms. Gilda Russomano, and included the
four lawyers for the families. The Honduran delegation did not object
to the participation of counsel for the victims and the Court accepted
the Commission's decision in this respect.
Honduras asserted that the case was improperly 'before the Court
because the Commission had not followed the procedures established in
the Convention for the treatment of cases denounced to the Commis-
sion. In particular, Honduras claimed that the Commission had not de-
clared at an early stage that the cases were admissible in accordance
with the Convention; 10 8 that the Commission had neglected to offer its
107. The hearing was held on June 15, 1987 in San Jos6, Costa Rica.
108. Articles 47 & 48 of the Convention.
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services to both parties in the controversy for the purposes of a
"friendly settlement";" 9 that the Commission had not conducted an
on-site investigation;"0 and that the complainants had not exhausted
their domestic remedies before submitting the case to an international
mechanism. "1' Honduras argued with regard to domestic remedies that
criminal investigations and potential prosecution for these abductions
were pending before Honduran courts, and that the relatives still had
available to them a variety of judicial actions and appeals (recursos)
which had not been used.The Commission responded that none of the objections were raised
by Honduras during the lengthy process before the Commission, even
though the Government had been given ample opportunity to do so. It
further maintained that the "friendly settlement" procedure was discre-
tionary. In response to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Com-
mission offered evidence that the relatives had attempted a variety of
judicial and diplomatic actions without success. The Commission also
argued that the remedies that need be exhausted before recourse to an
international body are only those actions in domestic law that are likely
to produce the desired result. In an unacknowledged detention the ap-
plication for habeas corpus is the only action which, if treated seriously
by the authorities, can determine the whereabouts of a detainee, as well
as the reasons for his or her arrest. In such cases, habeas corpus is the
only remedy that could reasonably be required of relatives before they
reach out to the international arena. The relatives here had filed several
requests for habeas corpus relief, among other actions.
The Commission also defended a doctrine of its own creation re-
garding the exhaustion of remedies. This doctrine evolved from the
Commission's practice and experience and is now reflected in the Com-
mission's Regulations and Article 46 of the Convention." 2 It is not nec-
essary to exhaust any remedies at all when the petitioner is prevented
from exercising them or when there is unjustified delay in the govern-
ment's response to them. In practice the doctrine applies to cases where
rememdies are clearly useless under circumstances of the particular
time and place. This has special importance to cases of disappearances
because the process inherently shields the abductors from any outside
control, rendering judicial remedies completely ineffective. Moreover,
forcing the "reappearance" of a victim, in the Commission's experi-
109. Article 48.1(f) of the Convention.
110. Article 48.2 of the Convention.
Ill. Article 46.1(a) of the Convention.
112. Article 37.2 of the Regulations of the Commission.
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ence, requires immediate intervention in the first few days after the
abduction. Finally, the Commission argued that the preliminary objec-
tions should be joined to the merits of the case to allow both parties to
offer and produce evidence on them.
On June 26, 1987, the Court issued its rulings on the preliminary
objections in all three cases. It found that the Commission was not obli-
gated to make a determination of admissibility, except if the Commis-
sion were to find that the case was clearly inadmissible according to the
Convention and to the Commission's own regulations. It also agreed
with the Commission that the "friendly settlement" procedure was not
a mandatory step in the process if there was no common ground on
which to base a settlement. The Court held that on-site investigations
are absolutely discretionary for the Commission. All of the objections
based on the Commission's internal regulations were rejected, thus up-
holding the authority of the Commission. The only remaining objection
was the all-important issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies which
the Court decided to join to the merits. 113
In its decision on the merits in Velbsquez, the Court ruled on the
exhaustion of remedies."" The Court fully agreed that in each case all
reasonable remedies had in fact been exhausted before resorting to the
Commission. In a ruling of landmark precedential value, the Court fur-
ther agreed with the Commission's doctrine that a petitioner need only
exhaust those remedies that can be reasonably expected to produce the
desired result: an end to the specific violation of human rights that is
the subject of the complaint. The Court also supported the Commis-
sion's waiver of the exhaustion requirement when the remedies are
meaningless under the circumstances, even if formally available." 5
C. Hearings on the Merits
A full week of hearings took place between September 30 and Oc-
tober 7, 1987. The Court heard a total of 21 witnesses. Leaders of
human rights organizations described their efforts to document disap-
pearances and to force authorities to acknowledge detentions. A lawyer
who worked on cases of the disappeared narrated his own imprisonment
and torture for the Court. Relatives explained the extensive actions
113. Velbsquez, Godinez and Fairbn and Solis Preliminary Judgments.
114. Velbsquez Judgment, Case 7920, INTER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988). The same
legal analysis and decision on the matter was later repeated in Godfnez Judgment, Case 8097,
INTER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 5 (1989); Fairn Garbi and Solis Corrales Judgment, Case 7951,
INTER-AM. CT.H.R. (ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
115. Velhsquez Judgment, at paras. 50-81.
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each of them undertook in their anguished quest for news about their
loved ones. A former prisoner informed the Court that he had briefly
seen Angel Manfredo Veldsquez in a police lock-up only days after his
abduction. Former Costa Rican government officials gave testimony
about their diplomatic initiatives to find Francisco Fair~n Garbi and
Yolanda Solis Corrales, describing the lack of cooperation they re-
ceived from the Honduran government. Each witness was first ex-
amined by a member of the Commission's delegation, then cross-ex-
amined by a member of the Honduran delegation, and finally examined
individually by each member of the Court.
The most revealing testimony came from In6s Consuelo Murillo
and Florencio Caballero. Ms. Murillo is a Honduran law graduate who
spent eighty days in clandestine detention in 1983 before international
pressure forced the Government to acknowledge her arrest. She then
spent more than a year in prison and was finally expelled from Hondu-
ras, living in exile first in Germany and then in Mexico. Ms. Murillo
described her abduction near San Pedro Sula and the torture she suf-
fered while being held in two different clandestine detention centers
until she was eventually turned over to regular police authorities. She
identified by name some of her captors and torturers."' 6
Florencio Caballero was an interrogator for the secret Battalion
316, the unit of the Honduran armed forces that conducted the cam-
paign of disappearances between 1981 and 1984. He defected in 1986
and was living as a refugee in Canada when he travelled to Costa Rica
to testify. He gave details of the organization and history of Battalion
316, of its composition and tactics, as well as of the Battalion's involve-
ment in several celebrated cases. He informed the Court that he and
other members of the Battalion had been trained in the United States
and that American intelligence agents maintained close contact with
Battalion 316 at the height of the 1981-84 disappearances campaign. 7
The Commission had proposed one witness, Sergeant Jos6 Isalas
Vilorio, who did not appear at the first hearing. Sergeant Vilorio was
implicated in the abduction of Manfredo Vehisquez. The Court asked
the Honduran government to locate Mr. Vilorio, as well as two higher-
ranking officers whose names had come up during the hearings for their
involvement in Battalion 316: Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Her-
ndndez and Lieutenant Marco Tulio Regalado Hernindez. The Court
116. ACAFADE, Honduras: Desaparecidos, Juicio y Condena [Honduras: The Disap-
peared, Trial and Condemnation](partial, unofficial transcript of some of the hearings).
117. Id.
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set a new hearing for January 1988, and ordered all three to appear.
Additionally, the Court requested a description of the command struc-
ture of Battalion 316.
In the ensuing negotiations, Honduras revealed that Vilorio would
not appear before the Court. The Honduran delegation offered "an ex-
planation" by the Honduran Chief of Army Intelligence, Colonel Ro-
berto Nfifiez Montes: Vilorio was murdered in Honduras only a few
days before he was to appear at a second hearing set by the Court, and
exactly one day after the Government had publicly announced that he
would appear. The other three officers did, however, testify.118 Ndinez
admitted the existence of Battalion 316 and its intelligence function,
though he claimed that it was an inoffensive training unit. He and Al-
exander Herndndez categorically denied that the latter had ever been
assigned to Battalion 316, though a year later Alexander Herndndez
twice admitted his involvement with Battalion 316 in Honduran press
interviews. Regalado insisted that he had been no more than a traffic
cop.' 19 Although there were no important revelations, their wooden ex-
planations and demeanor raised serious doubts about their credibility.
Consequently, their appearance strengthened the Commission's case.
D. Documentary Evidence and Investigatory Efforts
The Honduran government did not call a single witness. Both the
Commission and the Honduran government produced some documen-
tary evidence. It remained for the Commission, however, to search for
and produce the most important documents. Essentially, the effort to
search through judicial and administrative records looking for a paper
trail was left entirely to the lawyers for the relatives with the assistance
of Honduran human rights activists. The Court did not commission any
of its officials to look for documentary evidence outside of its seat.
Mr. Vivanco found records of some of the applications for habeas
corpus, as well as the autopsy report of the corpse thought to belong to.
Francisco Fair~n Garbi. He and Mr. M~ndez later searched in Guate-
mala for immigration and customs records to clarify whether Fair~n
and Yolanda Solis had actually entered Guatemala. Some of these
records were then submitted to document examiners who produced ex-
pert reports. Well-known forensic anthropologists from the United
118. The hearing for the Honduran Army officers was held in private over the Commission's
objections.
119. See transcripts of the Jan. 20, 1988 hearing. For Herndndez's contradictions, see infra
text accompanying note 214.
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States and Argentina were asked to determine from the autopsy report
the likelihood that the corpse of "La Montanita" belonged to Fair6n on
the basis of comparison with pre-mortem dental records. The results
were inconclusive. An exhumation of the corpse for an actual compari-
son was never done because the government never identified the place
where the remains were buried.'
The failure to find the remains purported to belong to Fair6n - a
fact that if verified would have changed the outcome of the Fairbn case
- illustrates the attitude of the Honduran government throughout the
proceedings. Its delegation attended every hearing and used its oppor-
tunities to cross-examine witnesses and to make legal and factual argu-
ments. But it was totally uncooperative with the Commission and later
with the Court in providing any useful information or facilitating the
gathering of evidence.'21 In addition to a performance by its attorneys
that, to be generous, can be regarded as lackluster, Honduras partici-
pated in the case without any interest in finding out the truth or in
contributing to the development of an important protection mechanism.
Repeated press statements by government officials (including some who
participated as attorneys for Honduras) made it clear that the govern-
ment thought that it deserved great credit for not pulling out of the
proceedings altogether. Legally, however, pulling out was not an option
for Honduras since its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is without
condition or reservation.
120, See reports by Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense (dated in Buenos Aires,
Nov. 21, 1987) with Dr. Mariano Castex of the Academy of Medicine of Buenos Aires, and by
Dr. Clyde Snow (Oklahoma City, December 1987), both entered into the record of the Court. Dr.
Snow and the Equipo have obtained well-deserved recognition for their work in identifying re-
mains of victims of the "dirty war" in Argentina and elsewhere. Two members of the Equipo,
Mercedes Doretti and Luis Fondebrider, were given the Reebok Human Rights Award for 1989.
Snow, Stover & Hannibal, Scientists as Detectives, TECHNOLOGY REV. (Feb./Mar. 1989);
T.M.B., Ning[in Nombre: Identifying Argentina's 'desaparecidos,' SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 1989);
Unsworth, The Body Hunters, INDEPENDENT MAG. (Sept. 30, 1989); Constable, More Painful
Memories Unearthed in Argentina, The Boston Globe, April 27, 1987, at 1; Golden, No-name
Graves Tell Story of Argentine Killings, The Miami Herald, Dec. 3, 1987.
121. The Court issued a severe reprimand of this conduct in the Fairkn and Solis Judg-
ment: "La falta de diligencia, cercana a veces al obstruccionismo, mostrada por el Gobierno al no
responder a reiteradas solicitudes. . .[The lack of diligence, sometimes approaching obstruction-
ism, shown by the Government in not responding to repeated requests...]," Fairbn and Soils
Judgment, at para. 160.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS IN Velbsquez, Godinez AND Fairkn
and Sol s
A. Findings of Fact: A Deliberate, Systematic Pattern of
Disappearances
The decisions in Velibsquez, Godinez and Fairn and Solis provide
support to the work of the human rights movement, which for years has
strived to describe and publicize the horrendous practice of disappear-
ance to the international community. Human rights NGOs as well as
inter-governmental organizations have frequently tried to expose ele-
ments and characteristics involved in this crime. The Commission, in
response to the preliminary objections of the Honduran government,
exposed and later proved through witnesses and documented evidence,
different aspects of the practice.during the Court's public hearings.122
The objective behind the evidence presented by the Commission was to
demonstrate the existence of a systematic pattern of disappearances
conducted by the Honduran Armed Forces from 1981 to 1984, with at
least the acquiescence of the government.
The Court, accepting the Commission's allegations, found that be-
tween 100 and 150 persons disappeared in Honduras during that period
under the following circumstances (modus operandi):
(1) Abduction "of the victim by force, often in broad daylight and in
public places, by armed men in civilian clothes and disguises, who ac-
ted with apparent impunity and who used vehicles without any official
identification, with tinted windows and with false license plates or no
plates at all."12 When the abduction is carried out in the daytime and
in a public place the purpose may be to terrorize the local community
or simply to act with brutality, displaying publicly the consequences of
behavior the authorities consider "unacceptable" or "dangerous." The
abduction may also occur under more controlled circumstances, in pri-
vate, and without witnesses. Such a secret abduction makes the act
harder to prove and the search for justice harder to achieve.
(2) The victims were usually individuals Honduran officials considered
dangerous to State security and who sometimes had been under
surveillance. 2'
(3) The arms employed were reserved for the official use of the military
and police, and the vehicles used had tinted glass, which requires spe-
122. Observations of the Commission on the Preliminary Objections of the Government of
Honduras, March 20, 1987 (Veliisquez, at 13).
123. Velisquez Judgment, at para. 147(b).
124. Id. at para. 147(d)(i).
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cial, official authorization.125
(4) The abductors blindfolded the victims, and took them to secret and
unofficial detention centers. They interrogated the victims and sub-
jected them to cruel, humiliating treatment and torture. Some were ul-
timately murdered and their bodies buried in clandestine cemeteries.126
(5) When questioned (by relatives, attorneys and even judges exercis-
ing writs of habeas corpus), the authorities systematically denied any
knowledge of the detention and the whereabouts of the victims.1"7 The
perpetrators were essentially shielded by official "ignorance."
B. Lack of Adequate Judicial Protection
The judicial, political and military authorities in the country either
denied the practice of disappearances or were incapable of preventing,
investigating or punishing those responsible for the acts.' 2 The Hondu-
ran judicial system did not produce any relevant result during 1981-84.
This lack of adequate judicial protection was considered by the Court
to be part of the deliberate and systematic pattern, as the Commission
had pleaded.129 The total ineffectiveness of habeas corpus deliberately
left Honduran citizens without even the minimum domestic remedies to
confront this State practice."' The Commission proved (and the Court
later declared) the ineffectiveness of habeas corpus by using multiple
forms of evidence, among them witnesses who testified that they were
temporarily disappeared themselves under the typical modus operandi,
and "later reappeared in the hands of the same authorities who had
systematically denied holding them or knowing their fate."'' In any
case, the reappearance of the victims was not the result of any legal
measure on their behalf, "but rather the result of other circumstances
such as the intervention of diplomatic missions or action taken by
human rights organizations."' 2
125. Id. at para. 147d(ii).
126. Id. at para. 147(d)(iii).
127. Id. at para. 147(d)(iv).
128. Id. at para. 147(d)(v).
129. Supra note 122.
130. The ineffectiveness of habeas corpus was further clarified:
[Alithough there might have been legal remedies in Honduras that occasionally allowed
a person detained by the authorities to be found, those remedies were ineffective be-
cause the imprisonment was clandestine, formal requirements made them inapplicable
in practice, the authorities against whom they were brought simply ignored them, or
attorneys and judges were threatened or intimated by those authorities.
Velbsquez Judgment, para. 80.
131. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 147(d)(iv).
132. Id. at para. 77.
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In this sense, the case of In~s Consuelo Murillo is extraordinarily
illustrative and dramatic. Murillo was abducted and remained disap-
peared for eighty days. 133 During her disappearance, Murillo's family
presented several legal actions on her behalf which proved totally inef-
fective. The government repeatedly denied involvement. At the same
time, Murillo's family mobilized domestic and international human
rights NGOs and diplomatic missions, 13  as well as the assistance of
the Honduran Ambassador in Canada (Murillo's uncle). This com-
bined pressure, and not the legal measures sought by her family, re-
sulted in Murillo's reappearance in the hands of military officials.'3 5
C. Distinction Drawn by the Court in Fairn-Solis: The Victims'
Identity as Part of the Pattern
As part of the pattern of disappearances in Honduras, the Court
declared that the victims were not neutral but "persons Honduran offi-
cials considered dangerous to State security."' 3' The Commission high-
lighted this element when describing the phenomenon of disappear-
ances. It said "the victims of disappearances may be persons suspected
of posing a threat to the security of the State, but the designation of
"targets" of repression extends to others as well.'' 3 The Commission
sought to illustrate the use of disappearance to selectively eliminate po-
litical dissidents, but the Commission did not discount the possibility of
indiscriminate repression.
The Court drew upon the Commission's analysis in the Velibsquez
and Godinez cases. In both, the victims had been involved in activities
considered dangerous by the government.138 The exception applies,
however, when the case of Fairn-Solls is considered. As far as anyone
knows, neither Fair~n nor Solis were involved in similar activities. The
Court found that Honduras was not responsible for the disappearances
133. Murillo was abducted in San Pedro Sula, Honduras on March 13, 1983. During her
detention, Murillo was interrogated, tortured and sexually abused by her captors in a clandestine
location.
134. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany was closely involved in efforts to
locate Murillo because of her mother's German origin.
135. Velibsquez Judgment, at paras. 84, 85, 86, 87 & 118(c).
136. Velibsquez Judgment, at para. 147(d)(i); Godinez Judgment, at para. 153(d)(i);
Fairkn-Solls Judgment, at para. 153(d)(i).
137. Observations of the Commission of the Preliminary Objections of the Government of
Honduras)(emphasis added). Fairn-Solis Judgment, at 66-67.
138. Velisquez was a student leader at the Autonomous National University of Honduras.
Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 3 & 147(g)(i). Godinez was a leader of the teachers' union in the
town of Choluteca. Godinez Judgment, at para. 154.
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inter alia because the victims lacked the political activity of Veltsquez
and Godinez. Apparently the Court considered this characteristic to be
critical in showing State involvement. In its final judgment the Court
declared: "the connection between the disappearances of Francisco
Fair~n Garbi and Yolanda Solis Corrales and the mentioned govern-
mental practice has not sufficiently been proved. There is no evidence
that they were the subject of Honduran government surveillance or sus-
"9139pected as dangerous ... .
A careful examination of the decision reveals that the Commission
and the parents of the victims were not aware of any political activities
on the part of Fair~n or Solis, which in the logic of the Court could
have made them a target of repression. However, the decision itself
refers to an investigation conducted in Costa Rica by the local judicial
authorities that shows the victims were apparently involved in some
kind of support of political activities in Guatemala and El Salvador,
and that their final destination could have been either of those coun-
tries. 140 The Court did not analyze this report, except as part of the
presumptions that the Court used to demonstrate that the Costa Rican
couple "would have been able to continue their trip from Honduras to
Guatemala and, possibly to El Salvador,"141 suggesting that they could
have disappeared outside Honduras.
It is an error to relieve the Honduran government of responsibility
in the disappearances of Fair~n and Solis because the extent of their
political activity was unclear.
The victims' character and activities must be an element of analy-
sis in ascertaining State responsibility but it ought not be the main
determinant of such responsibility. Under the Court's rationale, a vic-
tim would not qualify for regional protection if his or her political ac-
tivities were even so discreet as to preclude the family's knowledge
(which could apply perfectly to the present case) or if the family fails
to prove that their relative was a threat to the security to the State.
Moreover, the Court itself, drawing upon existing knowledge of
the practice, states that when this kind of policy is officially enforced,
impunity is insured for those responsible. In the Godinez case, the
Court said "the practice of disappearances itself creates a climate in-
compatible with the guarantee of human rights by the States Parties in
the Convention, in that it relaxes the minimum standards of conduct
139. Fairn-Solis Judgment, at para. 158.
140. The investigation was conducted by the Organization of Judicial Investigations of the
Costa Rican judiciary in 1982. See Fair~n and Solis Judgment, at para. 119.
141. Fairkn and Solis Judgment, at para. 119, referring to para. 156.
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that should govern security forces and allows such forces to violate
those rights with impunity."14 In other words, this special climate of
repression leaves ample room for any kind of abuse and encourages
multiple violations of human rights by security forces against political
and non-political victims.143
D. The Court's Vision of Disappearances: A Crime Under the
Convention
In its submissions to the Court and during the public hearings, the
Honduran government argued that it had not violated the Convention
because forced disappearance is not specified as a crime in the Conven-
tion. 4 The Commission strongly rejected this argument in its response
and warned the government of the dangerous logic of a proposition sug-
gesting that disappearances are permissible because the Convention is
silent on this matter.
The Court established that disappearance is a repressive technique
used by governments in a systematic manner, not only to bring about
the disappearance of individuals, either briefly or permanently, but also
as a means of creating a general state of anguish, insecurity and fear
among the public. 4" The Court mentioned many of the initiatives
taken by the international community in order to combat this practice,
such as the United Nations Working Group on Disappearances and the
adoption ,by the Inter-American system of many resolutions condemn-
ing this phenomenon. Although there is no specific convention against
disappearances in force yet, the Court acknowledged that the interna-
tional practice and doctrine have often categorized disappearances as a
crime against humanity.""
142. Godinez Judgment, at para. 167.
143. See Miguel Angel Rivas Hernibndez, Res. No. 28/88, Case No. 9844, El Salvador,
OEA ser.L/V/1 1.74, doc.10 rev.I, at 16 (1988). This is a case of a non-political victim who was
disappeared by military agents over a personal dispute; "Some individuals are abducted inciden-
tally - because they happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time." Berman & Clark, State
Terrorism: Disappearances, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 531, 533 (citing J. TIMMERMAN. PRISONER WITH-
OUT A NAME. CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER); see also Nunca Mibs, Report of the National Commis-
sion on Disappearance of Persons (1984).
144. Submission of the Government of Honduras in Fairn-Solls, at 24.
145. In Latin America, this instrument of repression has been applied both indiscriminately
and selectively, depending on the political circumstances of the country. Disappearances have not
been used exclusively by military dictatorships. In civilian governments with democratic origins,
there have been and continue to exist disappearances. The most serious human rights violations
and massive disappearances in Honduras history occurred during the civilian government of Ro-
berto Suazo Cordova, following many years of military dictatorships.
146. Velhsquez Judgment, at paras. 151, 152, 153. Crimes against humanity, such as geno-
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The Court, responding to the challenge of the Honduran govern-
ment regarding the inapplicability of the Convention to disappearances,
declared "the forced disappearance of human beings is a multiple and
continuous violation of many rights under the Convention that the
States Parties are obligated to respect and guarantee. 147 Therefore,
for the Court the practice of disappearance constitutes a radical breach
of the Convention and implies ". . . a crass abandonment of the values
which emanate from the concept of human dignity and of the most
basic principles of the Inter-American system and the Convention. '4 8
E. Articles of the Convention that were Violated
1. Violations of Articles Four, Five and Seven
The Court sustained the Commission's petition and held the Hon-
duran government responsible, in Velbsquez and Godinez, for violating
Article 4, 5 and 7 of the Convention. Specifically, those articles of the
Convention which protect the right to life, right to humane treatment,
right to personal liberty and the general obligation to respect and guar-
antee rights were violated through the practice of disappearance.
The practice of disappearances assumes the clandestine execution
of the individual and then the hiding of the cadaver so as to assure that
the whereabouts can never be found. For the family of the victim, the
experience will be one of permanent anguish, for they will never be
able to trace the fate of their loved one. The Court established that this
kind of repression is a blatant violation of the right to life embodied in
the Convention149 and often "meant secret execution without trial, fol-
lowed by concealment of the body."15 The Court found that Article' 4
was violated in Velbsquez and Godinez. In both cases the context in
which the victims' disappearances took place and the lack of knowledge
about their fate many years later was sufficient to create the reasonable
presumption that they were killed. Even if there is a minimum chance
of the victims being alive, the Court recognized that there is a strong
presumption of their murder, particularly taking into account that they
cide and slavery carry the implied effect that they are subject to universal jurisdiction, that statute
of limitations is inapplicable, and that States are obligated to extradite culprits for the purpose of
prosecution.
147. Velhsquez Judgment, at para. 155.
148. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 158; see also Articles 4, 5, 7 & 1.1 of the Convention.
149. "Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by
law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life." Article 4 of the Convention.
150. Velbsquez Judgment, at 68, para. 157.
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were abducted "by authorities who systematically executed detainees
without trial and concealed their bodies in order to avoid
punishment."'' 5 1
The Convention forbids torture, and any other forms of cruel and
inhuman treatment, and states that "all persons deprived of their lib-
erty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.''12 As a typical aspect of the modus operandi that character-
izes the practice of disappearances, the Court held that victims who
were disappeared both temporarily and permanently were systemati-
cally subjected to "merciless treatment, including all types of indigni-
ties, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."' 58
Furthermore, one of the most important contributions of the judg-
ments has been to give an expansive interpretation of Article 5, estab-
lishing a new principle of human rights protection in the Inter-Ameri-
can system. The Court declared that "prolonged isolation and
deprivation of communication are in themselves cruel and inhuman
treatment, harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the per-
son." Hence, State Parties may be condemned for cruel and inhuman
treatment for the prolonged isolation of a prisoner, independent of any
physical ill-treatment by the authorities. In the cases of Manfredo Ve-
lIsquez and Saul Godinez, although there was no direct proof that ei-
ther was tortured, the Court condemned the government of Honduras
based upon the above interpretation of Article 5 of the Convention. 54
By elevating the common practice of abusive incommunicado detention
to the status of cruel and inhuman treatment, the Court permits a more
effective protection of human rights throughout the continent.
The Court determined that the abduction of the victim, which is
the first step in the criminal practice of disappearances, violates Article
7 of the Convention which guarantees "every person the right to per-
sonal liberty and security." Applying Article 7, the Court held that
"the kidnapping of a person is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty which
also violates the right of the person detained to be taken without delay
before a judge and to invoke the appropriate procedures to review the
legality of the arrest. . . ."I" Specifically, the Court held that Vels-
151. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 188; Godinez Judgment, at para. 198.
152. Article 5 of the Convention.
153. Godinez Judgment, at para. 153(d)(iii) with reference to para. 164; Velizsquez Judg-
ment, at para. 147(d)(iii) with reference to para. 156.
154. Ve/Isquez Judgment, at paras. 96 & 187; Godinez Judgment, at para. 197.
155. Velibsquez Judgment, at para. 155; Godinez Judgment, at para. 163. Article 7 also
extends its protection to include the right to trial within a reasonable time or to be released with-
out prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings.
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quez and Godinez, as a result of their disappearances, were the victims
of arbitrary detentions which deprived them of their physical liberty
without legal cause. 5'
2. Establishing State Responsibility: Violation of Article 1.1
Another important contribution by the Court was the application
of Article 1.1 of the Convention to the cases against Honduras, estab-
lishing a significant precedent in the Inter-American system. The Com-
mission did not allege this violation. However, the Court established
the international responsibility of the Honduran government relying ex-
tensively on the duties created by Article 1.1 of the Convention."5 7 In
making this determination, the Court was faced with the challenge of
examining the circumstances under which a specific act in violation of
the Convention can be attributed to a State Party.'
Article 1.1 of the Convention is a general article that establishes
the duty of governments to respect the human rights of individuals and
to guarantee the enjoyment of those rights recognized in the Conven-
tion. Under the Court's analysis, each of the Convention's rights must
be interpreted in conjunction with Article.1.1, which is "the generic
basis for the protection of the rights recognized by the Conven-
tion. . . ."59 Consequently, where the Court determines a violation of
any right by a State Party, it ipso jure establishes the violation of Arti-
cle 1.1.160
The Court interpreted this article in two different ways: first, it
recalled that State Parties have the obligation to respect all the rights
embodied in the Convention. Even in serious emergency situations, the
Court reaffirmed the principle that the State under no circumstances
may suspend the exercise of a basic category of "non-derrogable"
rights such as the right to life, the right to humane treatment, and the
right to juridical personality.' 6'
Second, and even more importantly, the Court stated that Article
1.1 creates the positive obligation of States Parties to take all necessary
156. Velisquez Judgment, at para. 186; Godinez Judgment, at para. 196.
157. Ve/isquez Judgment, at para. 163. The Court applied the general principle of law,
iura novit curia, under which a court has the power and the duty to apply the legal provisions
relevant to a proceeding, even when the parties do not expressly invoke them.
158. Id. at para. 160. On the issue of State responsibility under international law, see
Shelton, supra note 5.
159. Id. at para. 163.
160. Id. at para. 162.
161. See Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention. Velibsquez Judgment, at para. 154 in refer-
ence to para. 165; see also supra note 78, at para. 23.
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measures to guarantee the free and full exercise of all the rights con-
tained in the Convention. In order to achieve this end, the State must
organize the governmental machinery and structures of political power
in a way that offers an effective remedy for human rights violations. If
the State negligently fails to assume this active role, it can be held
liable under international law for human rights violations.1"'
As a consequence of this affirmative obligation, the State has the
concrete duties to prevent, investigate, punish, disclose and compensate
(when restoration is impossible) victims or their relatives for human
rights violations.'6 3
However, the State cannot pretend that only the existence of a
formal legal system of human rights protection fulfills the requirements
of Article 1.1 of the Convention. On the contrary, the State must
demonstrate an effective and coherent conduct which is aimed at
resolving human rights matters within its territory. 64 In accordance
with this principle, a State may be liable for crimes such as disappear-
ance, because it has failed to perform its Article 1.1 duties. 65
Confronted with the need to establish State responsibility under
international law for the acts of State agents in disappearances, the
Court developed a broader concept of State accountability designed to
expand liability to different case scenarios. For instance, a State may
be liable under any circumstance in which a State organ, representative
or public entity, in the exercise of its official powers, violates the rights
guaranteed in the Convention.'" In order to enhance the effectiveness
of international protection, the Court added that a State is responsible
for such acts or omissions of its agents, regardless of whether they con-
stitute violations of domestic law or are done outside the sphere of offi-
cial authority. 67 Furthermore, according to Article 1.1, a State is not
excused from liability should an agent's identity remain unknown.'68
When human rights violations are not committed by governmental
agents but by an independent group or private individual, the Court,
again interpreting Article 1.1, distinguished two types of situations in
which a State could be accountable: first, if it is proved that such an
independent group acted with the tolerance or acquiescence of the
162. Id. at para. 166.
163. Id.
164. Id. at para. 167.
165. Id. at para. 182.
166. Id. at para. 169.
167. Id. at para. 170.
168. Id. at para. 173.
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State;169 second, where a private individual violates human rights and
the State fails to show diligence in his or her prosecution. In this sec-
ond case, the State is obviously not responsible for acts of private per-
sons themselves, but liability attaches due to its failure to offer ade-
quate judicial protection. This interpretation provides grounds for State
liability in cases where the government tries to conceal the investiga-
tion to safeguard its own interests, thereby engaging in an obstruction
of justice. 170
With regard to the facts of Veltsquez and Godinez, the Court
found a total failure on the part of the Honduran judicial and political
systems to take even the minimal steps necessary to prevent and inves-
tigate these cases.17' The Court also declared that there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a conclusion that the victims' disappearances were
carried out by agents of the State, acting under cover of public author-
ity. Although the Court was convinced that these disappearances were
performed by governmental agents, it noted that, even if that fact had
not been proven, the State apparatus had created a climate in which
the crime of enforced disappearance was committed with impunity. Af-
ter the disappearance of Saul Godinez, the government's failure to act
- which the Court found to be clearly proven - constituted a failure
on the part of Honduras to fulfill its duties under Article 1.1 of the
Convention, which obligated it to ensure Saul Godinez the free and full
exercise of his human rights."' 72
Similarly, despite the fact that in Velasquez and Godinez there
was no evidence that their disappearances were the result of official
orders, under Article 1.1 the Court found this factor irrelevant in find-
ing State liability. 173 It also recognized that although there was no di-
rect proof that Veldsquez and Godinez had been tortured, the State
was liable because of its failure to comply with the duties imposed by
Article 1.1 since they had been abducted and imprisoned by "govern-
mental authorities who have been shown to subject detainees to indigni-
ties, cruelty and torture. .. .
The Court's treatment of Article 1.1 offers an excellent mecha-
nism in establishing State liability, particularly in disappearance cases
where the crime by definition supposes complete impunity and an ab-
169. Id. at para. 173 in reference to para. 176.
170. Id. at para. 172.
171. Velbsquez Judgment, at paras. 178-80; Godinez Judgment, at paras. 189-90.
172. Godinez Judgment, at para. 192; see also Velasquez Judgment, at para. 182.
173. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 183; Godinez Judgment, at para. 193.
174. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 187; Godinez Judgment, at para. 197.
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sence of direct evidence.
F. Dictum About the Obligation of the State to Prevent,
Investigate, Punish, Disclose and Compensate
In accordance with the above interpretation of Article 1.1, the
State is under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human
rights violations. 175 The State must show a record which reveals a clear
will and commitment on its part to fully implement the rights stated in
the Convention. For instance, the State shall adopt and develop all le-
gal, political, administrative and cultural policies necessary to promote
human rights and ensure that those responsible for abuses are properly
penalized. 76
The Court ruled that the State has the obligation to conduct a
serious investigation of human rights violations and identify those re-
sponsible. 7 7 If the investigation does not produce concrete results, the
State, under its duty to prevent violations, must at least demonstrate
that it has attempted seriously to search for the truth "and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective.' 1 78 In other words, the
State should do whatever is within its means to investigate human
rights violations and should assume this obligation as a State duty
rather than one dependent upon private initiative. 179
The Court stated that:
[I]f the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes
unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not re-
stored as soon as possible, it has failed to comply with its duty to
guarantee the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons
within its jurisdiction. 8"
The Court further explained that if the violation is committed by a
private party and the State fails to conduct a serious investigation, it
may be deemed to have aided or supported the perpetrator and it will,
therefore, be liable at an international level. 8'
Because disappearance is a crime that involves multiple and con-
tinuous violations of rights protected by the Convention, the effects of
175. Velisquez Judgment, at para. 166.
176. Velhisquez Judgment, at paras. 172, 174-5.
177. Id. at para. 174.
178. Id. at para. 177.
179. Velisquez Judgment, at paras. 177 & 180.
180. Id. at para. 176.
181. Id. at para. 177.
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which are prolonged over time, the State's duty to investigate exists as
long as there remains any uncertainty about the fate of the
disappeared."8 2
The duty to punish human rights violators is repeatedly mentioned
in the Court's decisions as one of the State's basic affirmative duties
contained in Article 1.1 of the Convention.18" Nevertheless, in its anal-
ysis of a State's duty to conduct a serious investigation of the fate of
the disappeared person, the Court apparently watered down this impor-
tant obligation, accepting the existence of legitimate circumstances
under which those responsible for violations cannot be punished. The
Court held that:
Even in the hypothetical case that those individually responsible for
crimes of this .type cannot be legally punished under certain circum-
stances, the State is obligated to use the means at its disposal to
inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and as may be the
case, the location of their remains.8 4
The Court did not explain what circumstances would make it le-
gally impossible to punish these crimes. If the Court was referring to
the statute of limitations or to the effect of amnesty laws in crimes of
disappearance, this would be an unfortunate holding. The international
community, international practice and doctrine, and the Court itself
have recognized that disappearances are crimes against humanity, to
which a statute of limitations or any other restriction on punishment is
inapplicable. 185
The Court's statement, nonetheless, unquestionably reaffirms the
absolute right of the relatives to demand and obtain information from
the State regarding the fate and whereabouts of the victim. The State
has an obligation to satisfy this demand or it will be held liable under
Article 1.1 of the Convention.
G. Standard of Evidence and Burden of Proof
The Velbsquez and Godinez judgments each included a section ex-
plaining the creative legal guidelines the Court considered when it ex-
amined the evidence. 186 Many of the Court's criteria reaffirmed and
182. Id. at paras. 155 & 181.
183. Velbsquez Judgment, at paras. 166, 172, 174-76, 178.
184. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 181.
185. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 153; Godinez Judgment, at para. 161.
186. Godinez Judgment, at paras. 128-145; Velibsquez Judgment, at paras. 122-139. The
Court recognized that there was no rule on point in the Inter-American system. See Godinez
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further developed conceptual elements previously introduced by the
Commission in its briefs and oral arguments during the trial.187
The Commission assumed the role of a true prosecutor, openly
stating since the beginning of the proceeding that its task was to
demonstrate that during a specific period (1981-1984) in Honduras,
there was an official policy of disappearances carried out or tolerated
by the government. The Commission had to prove, not only the exis-
tence of a practice, but also that such a policy was designed inter alia
to conceal and destroy evidence of the crime. Manfredo Veldsquez,
Saul Godinez, Francisco Fair~n and Yolanda Solis, the Commission ar-
gued, were typical victims of this practice. Their disappearances could
be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical
inference; it was otherwise impossible to prove that an individual had
been made to disappear. 88
With regard to the burden of proof, the Court confirmed the Com-
mission's approach in a very precise manner, ruling that because the
Commission was accusing the government of the disappearances of Ve-
lIsquez and Godinez, it bore the burden of proving the facts in its
prima facie case.' 89 Therefore, according to the Court's criteria, once
the official practice of disappearances in Honduras had been proved,
the next step for the Commission was to prove that the disappearances
of Veldsquez and Godinez were part of the official practice because, for
instance, they had occurred through the same modus operandi."9 ' The
Court found that the Commission did establish the link between the
disappearances of Veldsquez and Godinez and the pattern employed
during the specific period. In future disappearance cases, therefore, it
will be necessary first to prove the pattern and then, how the specific
case is connected to it.' 9 ' Conversely, in Fairn and Solis, the Court
again found that a pattern existed, but ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to show that the disappearance of the two Costa Rican citi-
zens was part of the pattern.
The Court also found that the Honduran government played an
excessively passive role in the production of evidence by simply assert-
Judgment, at para. 133; Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 127.
187. See "Commission's Observations in Velbsquez, Godinez and Fairbn and Solis, March
20, 1987; see also "Commission's Observations in Vellsquez, Godinez and Fairln and Solis, July
13, 1988, rejected by the Court as untimely; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, June 8, 1988.
188. Godinez Judgment, at para. 130; Vellsquez Judgment, at para. 124.
189. Godinez Judgment, at para. 129; Velisquez Judgment, at para. 123.
190. Godinez Judgment, at para. 132; Velsquez Judgment, at para. 126.
191. Godinez Judgment, at para. 153; Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 147.
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ing that the Commission failed to prove a practice of disappearance. 192
Honduras cited a lack of direct proof in the Velbsquez and Godinez
cases1" and questioned the credibility of the Commission's witnesses. 94
The government did not offer a single piece of documentary evidence
on the merits of the cases.1 95 Furthermore, the Honduran government
neither attempted to explain the facts nor to prove the allegation that
Veldsquez and Godinez had been abducted by common criminals or
had voluntarily disappeared.' 96 The Court warned Honduras that its
lack of cooperation, silence and elusive or ambiguous answers during
the litigation could be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the truth of
the allegations.197
The Court ruled that in the crime of disappearance, fairness would
require shifting the burden of proof to the State once a prima facie
case had been made, and that the Court was empowered to compel
Honduras to produce exculpatory evidence.' 98 The fact that States have
a virtual monopoly of access to definitive evidence was particularly rel-
evant for the Court. Although the Court was reluctant to apply this
procedural principle automatically, it reserved its discretion to consider
Honduras's silence or inaction in evaluating the evidence as a whole.' 99
As to the standard of evidence, the Court recognized that the evi-
dence presented should convincingly establish the truth of the charges,
especially taking into account the seriousness of finding a State respon-
sible for engaging in or tolerating a practice of disappearances. 00 Cit-
ing international jurisprudence, the Court held that as an international
tribunal it had the power to weigh evidence freely, without the con-
straints of a rigid rule as to the quantum of proof necessary to support
its decision.2 0' The standard of evidence in the international legal pro-
cess is therefore less formal than in a domestic setting. 2
The Court gave three reasons explaining its holding. First, the
192. Godinez Judgment, at para. 131; Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 125.
193. Godinez Judgment, at para. 154(b)(vi).
194. Godinez Judgment, at paras. 147-51; Velbsquez Judgment, at paras. 141-145.
195. Godinez Judgment, at para. 143; Velhsquez Judgment, at para. 137.
196. Godinez Judgment, at para. 154(b)(vi); The only explanation by the Honduran author-
ities of both disappearances was a claim that Godinez and Veldsquez had joined subversive groups
or had gone to Cuba. See Godinez Judgment, at para. 154(b)(v); Velsquez Judgment, at para.
147(h).
197. Godinez Judgment at para. 144; Velhsquez Judgment, at para. 138.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Godinez Judgment, at para. 135; Velhsquez Judgment, at para. 129.
201. Godinez Judgment, at para. 133; Velhsquez Judgment, at para. 127.
202. Godinez Judgment, at para. 134; Velhsquez Judgment, at para. 128.
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Court distinguished the nature and purpose of the international protec-
tion of human rights from the objectives of a domestic criminal justice
system. The aim of international human rights law is not to punish the
perpetrators of violations - the State does not appear before the Court
as a defendant in a criminal action. Rather, the aim of international
human rights law is to protect the victims and order a compensation for
damages resulting from acts of State responsibility.20 3 Second, because
the State has complete control over the verification of facts which occur
within its territory, international human rights supervision may often
be conditioned on State collaboration in searching for the evidence.2"4
Beyond its own prestige, the Court has no real power to compel a State
to produce a witness or to search for evidence.2 05
In contrast to domestic criminal law, where the prosecution must
to prove its charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court declared
that, in international human rights proceedings, the State is not al-
lowed to rely on the petitioner's failure to present evidence when it can-
not be obtained without the State's cooperation.20 6
The final reason the Court provided for a less formal standard of
proof at an international level was related to the unique nature of the
crime of disappearance and the difficulty of proving an actual occur-
rence. The special characteristics of the crime of disappearance are
that there are often no witnesses and, should one exist, chances are
great he or she will be afraid to testify; agents perform with official
impunity in clandestine centers of detention and driving unidentified
cars; officials deny the detention; there is no corpse or it may never be
found; and, there is complete absence of a judicial remedy. Inherent to
the practice is a deliberate use of the State's power to destroy direct
evidence. Indeed, as the Commission noted on many occasions during
the hearings, the practice of disappearances is a clear attempt by the
203. Godinez Judgment, at para. 140; Velibsquez Judgment, at para. 134.
204. On the issue of the Commission's on-site investigation, see Article 48.2 of the Conven-
tion. For instance, as previously stated, the power of the Commission to conduct a fact-finding
mission requires the prior consent of a sovereign State.
205. Velhsquez Judgment, at paras. 39-49; Godinez Judgment, at paras. 41-52; Fairbn and
Soils Judgment, at paras. 62-74; another example of this ineffectiveness was the Court's lack of
power to subpoena witnesses Israel Morales Chinchilla, Jorge Solares Zavala, Mario M6ndez
Ruiz, Mario Ramirez and Fernando Antonio L6pez Santizo (Fairn and Soils Judgment, at para.
35). All of them were Guatemalan immigration officials who could have shed light on whether
Fair~n and Solis had actually entered Guatemala. The fruitless requirements issued by the Court
to the Honduran government to obtain the exhumation of the corpse found in "La Montahita" are
yet other examples. See Fair~n and Soils Judgment, at paras. 48-61.
206. Godinez Judgment, at para. 141; Veihsquez Judgment, at para. 135.
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State to commit the perfect crime. 7
Confronted with the lack of direct testimonial or documentary evi-
dence, the Court, conscious of the objectives of the Convention and of
the responsibilities the Convention assigns, it ruled that circumstantial
evidence and indicia on which a judicial presumption could be built are
the only means available to prove the crime of disappearance. The
Court held that presumptive or inferential evidence, so long as it leads
to conclusions consistent with the facts, is a legitimate judicial mecha-
nism, used not only by international courts but by domestic courts as
well.2 0 8
VII. PROCEDURAL HIGHLIGHTS
A. Protection of Witnesses
The most dramatic moments in the litigation came immediately
after the first set of hearings on the merits, in September and October
of 1987. The hearings were widely covered in the Honduran press. In
the following days, Dr. Ram6n Custodio and other witnesses received
death threats and were publicly accused of betraying the nation and
seeking its humiliation. As the threats became more serious, the Presi-
dent (Chief Justice) of the Court, Colombian jurist Rafael Nieto
Navia °20 9 took the unusual step of sending a message to the government
of Honduras requesting special protection for the witnesses and an in-
vestigation into the threats against Custodio and others. Two of the
witnesses decided to leave the country, heading into exile in November.
On January 5, 1988, Jos6 Isaias Vilorio, who was scheduled to tes-
tify a few days later, was murdered in a suburb of Tegucigalpa.2 1° He
was killed by unknown assailants in front of many eyewitnesses, the
day after the government announced that Vilorio would indeed appear
before the Court in Costa Rica. His killers left a banner identifying
themselves with the Cinchoneros guerrilla organization, a small armed
group that had been inactive for some time.
On January 14, 1988, an unknown assailant riding on a motorcy-
cle killed Miguel Angel Pav6n in front of his house in San Pedro Sula.
207. Godinez Judgment, at para. 130; Velizsquez Judgment, at para. 124.
208. Godinez Judgment, at paras. 136-37, 155; Velbsquez Judgment, at paras. 130-31.
209. See Court Resolutions of January 15 & 18, 1988.
210. Vilorio, a sergeant in the Honduran police and a member of Battalion 316, had been
implicated by witnesses in the abduction of Manfredo Veldsquez. For that reason, the Commission
insisted on his testimony. After the initial set of hearings at which Vilorio's name came up, the
Court ordered Honduras to produce him.
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Pav6n was an alternate member of the Honduran legislative assembly
for a small opposition party, vice-president of CODEH and its repre-
sentative in San Pedro Sula. On September 30, 1987, he had been the
Commission's lead witness as the trial on the merits began.
Meeting in San Jos6 on January 15, 1988, the Court issued a reso-
lution, in the form of an injunction ("interim measures") demanding
that Honduras protect the witnesses. On January 18th, the Commis-
sion's delegation requested a special hearing on the matter which was
held on January 19th. At the Commission's request, the Court
amended its initial decision and ordered Honduras to provide informa-
tion to the Court within two weeks on the steps taken to investigate
both murders, as well as on measures taken to ensure the safety of all
other persons involved in the case.211
Honduras observed the deadline but provided very sketchy infor-
mation. Three weeks after the Pav6n murder there had been no au-
topsy, no ballistic tests and no questioning of potential suspects. As for
the Vilorio case, the government evidently thought that the attribution
of responsibility to the Cinchoneros exonerated it of any obligation to
investigate the crime. To this date both episodes remain unaccounted
for.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), a New
York-based NGO acting as amicus curiae, filed a brief in July 1988, as
the trial on the merits wound to an end, recommending that the Court
act to protect the integrity of its proceedings by renewing its demands
for an investigation and retaining jurisdiction over the murders as con-
nected to the principal. 1 ' In the Velbsquez judgment a few days later,
the Court acknowledged receipt of this brief but did not act on the
suggested action.2"' In December 1988, as a new session of the Court
approached with decisions in Godinez and FairMn-Solls still pending,
the LCHR filed a new amicus brief insisting on its petition. In the
Godinez decision the Court again ignored the request.
B. Perjury by Witnesses
In the meantime, Honduran media reported that Lieutenant Colo-
nel Alexander Herndndez had admitted in radio interviews that he had
211. Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. Instituto Inter-Americano de Der-
echos Humanos, REV. I.I.D.H. 73, para. 7 (Jan.-June 1988).
212. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Brief Amicus Curiae, Question of Witness
Protection Under Article 63(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (July 8, 1988).
213. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 37.
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been the Chief of Battalion 316, while denying that he or the unit had
engaged in any forced disappearance of persons.2" The LCHR filed a
new amicus brief in July 1989, noting that such an admission was in
direct and flagrant contradiction with what both Colonel Ntifiez Mon-
tes and Herndndez himself had told the Court under oath at the Janu-
ary 1988 hearings. The LCHR went on to suggest that in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the proceedings the Court should demand either
that Honduras punish both officers with the penalties contemplated for
perjury in its domestic law, or initiate criminal proceedings for perjury
against them.215
In July 1989, the Court acknowledged receipt of this brief but re-
jected the petition and simply resolved to relay the information to the
Honduran government. On the subject of the proper role of amici cu-
riae, the Court said, somewhat cryptically, that: "it [amici's role] could
not be other than collaboration with the Court in the study and resolu-
tion of matters submitted to its jurisdiction, but not to make petitions
that might obligate [the Court] to act or decide in one way or the
other.12 16 As far as can be determined, no inquiry has taken place to
determine whether Nfifiez and Herndndez had indeed lied to the Court
under oath. Both officers remain in active duty.
C. A Hearing Behind Closed Doors
From the start the Commission requested the testimony of Jos6
Isaias Vilorio, whose name had been linked to the disappearance of
Manfredo Veldsquez early in the proceedings. Vilorio did not show up
at the initial hearings on the merits, so the Commission requested that
the Honduran government order him to appear. In addition, the Court
sua sponte ordered the appearance of Alexander Herndndez and
Marco Tulio Regalado Herndndez, officers whose names had come up
in the witness stand as belonging to Battalion 316. The Court also re-
quested that Honduras provide an explanation of the command struc-
ture of that unit. Honduras agreed to require the officers to testify, and
in lieu of a document about Battalion 316, offered the testimony of the
Army Chief of Intelligence. For purported security reasons, however,
Honduras asked the Court to hold the hearing in Tegucigalpa, Hondu-
214. El Heraldo, December 3, 1988, at 45; El Heraldo, January 17, 1989, at 3.
215. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Sobre la Falsa Deposicibn de los Testigos
Alexander Hernhndez and Roberto N(hez Monies [Concerning the Perjury of Witnesses . . .
Brief Arnicus Curiae entered into the record, July 1989.
216. Resolution of July 21, 1989 in all three cases.
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ras, and in private.
The Commission objected to this proposal, citing not only the need
for its delegation to be able to cross-examine the witnesses, but also the
desirability that all of the Court's hearings be held in public, so that
any person in possession of useful information could come forward with
it.217 In negotiations between the Court and Honduras an agreement
was reached that the hearing would be held in San Jos6, Costa Rica,
but the Court granted the petition that it be closed to the public. On
January 20, 1988, the Court met at a previously undisclosed location,
to which the Commission's delegates were driven. As it turned out, the
hearing took place at a Costa Rican police facility within the San Jos6
airport, with the cooperation of the Costa Rican government. The three
officers (Vilorio had been killed a few days earlier) were flown in for
examination. The public was not allowed to be present, but otherwise
the hearing was conducted in the same manner as the rest, and the
Commission's lawyers had ample opportunity to cross-examine.
The decision to hold a closed hearing was severely criticized by the
relatives of the victims and by their support organizations. Regalado
Herndndez was uncooperative and incredible to the extent that many in
attendance wondered whether the man taking the stand was in fact
Regalado or a substitute. If the hearing had been public, persons who
knew the real Regalado Herndndez, either in attendance or examining
images taken by the press, could have settled the question of the iden-
tity of the witness.
The Court has discretion under its own rules to decide whether a
hearing will be open or closed to the public.21 Whether or not a subter-
fuge took place, however, the decision to hold a closed hearing to take
the testimony of military men constitutes an unfortunate precedent. A
closed hearing should be allowed only in the most extraordinary cir-
cumstances. An unwarranted distinction was made here between wit-
nesses, only because some of them wore military uniforms.
D. Opportunities for Expert Testimony
The facts in these cases presented several opportunities for the de-
velopment of evidence using advanced scientific techniques, which in
turn promotes the involvement of scientists and experts from several
disciplines in the protection of human rights.219 The exhumation of the
217. See Velhsquez Judgment, at 103, para. 32.
218. Article 14.1, Rules of Procedure of the Court.
219. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), through its Com-
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"corpse of La Montaiiita" would have been such an opportunity. Dr.
Snow and the Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense (EAAF) had
agreed to travel to Honduras for the exhumation and identification, but
Honduras never disclosed to the Court where the remains had been
buried. The Court asked the experts to compare the autopsy report
(which included some descriptive information about the body, including
a description of the deceased's teeth) with dental X-rays of Francisco
Fair6n Garbi. In separate reports, the EAAF and Dr. Snow (in the
latter case with the assistance of a forensic dentistry expert) found that
the information in the autopsy report was insufficient to make a posi-
tive identification.
The expert testimony clearly meant that it could not be ruled out
that Francisco Fair6n Garbi and the corpse found in La Montafhita
were the same person. This fact, added to the evident lack of coopera-
tion by Honduras in facilitating an exhumation, should have created a
presumption that Fair6n had been captured and killed in Honduras.
The autopsy report made clear that the deceased had been killed point-
blank, while handcuffed and kneeling down; also evident is that police
authorities deliberately lied about these circumstances when they gave
the photograph to the press and claimed that the victim had died "in a
confrontation." In the interest of getting to the bottom of the matter,
however, the Commission requested that the Court insist on its order to
Honduras to provide the location of the remains.
On January 20, 1989, the Court so ordered, adding that failure by
Honduras to comply would give rise to a presumption against it.2"' On
February 17, 1989, Honduras reported to the Court that it was impos-
sible to locate the remains because of disorganization in the cemetery's
files and because a recent hurricane had removed the earth in extensive
areas of the cemetery destroying many of the markings.221 No explana-
tion was given for the government's failure to locate, exhume - or at
mittee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, has been engaged for years in promoting the
application of new skills and technology to human rights work. It was at the initiative of the
AAAS that Dr. Clyde Snow developed his pioneering forensic research in Argentina, and trained
the young physicians and anthropologists who formed the Equipo Argentino de Antropologia
Forense (EAAF), as mentioned supra note 120. For other examples of science applied to human
rights, see E. STOVER & E. NIGHTINGALE, THE BREAKING OF BODIES AND MINDS: TORTURE,
PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 1 (1985); and 5 AM.J. FORENSIC MED. &
PATH. No. 4 (1984)(special issue on the use of forensic sciences in investigations of human rights
violations).
220. Fairbn and Solis Judgment, at para. 59.
221. Honduras brief of February 17, 1989 (cited in Fairbn and Solis Judgment, at para.
507]
HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
least preserve - the remains since 1982, in spite of promises made to
the Costa Rican government and to the Commission. In March, the
Commission asked the Court to enforce the presumption.222 The lan-
guage in the final Fairbn and Solis judgment suggests that the Court
did not enforce the presumption, in spite of its own clear notice to Hon-
duras: citing the January 20, 1989 order, the Court says that lack of
compliance "could give rise to a presumption ... .
Other opportunities for expert testimony were presented by the
discovery, by the authors of this article, of a form filed in the records of
a customs office in the border between Guatemala and Honduras,
which reflected the temporary importation of a motor vehicle into Gua-
temala and carried a legible signature with the words "Francisco
Fair6n Garbi." A document examiner with extensive experience in the
United States compared the form to authentic writings and signatures
of Francisco Fair~n Garbi, and noticed several differences. He re-
quested more authentic models for comparison before issuing a final
judgment on whether the signature had been forged. The Commission
presented the document to the Court, together with the expert's prelim-
inary opinion.224 The Court decided to hire its own document examiner,
and submitted the document, with additional authentic writings of
Fair~n Garbi, to Venezuelan expert Dimas Oliveros Sifontes. The re-
port produced by this expert squarely stated that the signature was
authentic.22
This report seems to have carried great weight with the Court. In
effect, however, it simply states the general theory about differences
between signatures by the same person. It acknowledges differences be-
tween the writing in the questioned document and the way Fair~n ha-
bitually signed, but gives no explanation for those differences. There
was no discussion, for example, of the possibility that Fair~n had in-
deed signed the document but done so under duress. In a brief filed on
December 5, 1988, the Commission pointed out the weaknesses in the
222. Commission Brief of March 10, 1989, entered into the record of Fairbn and Soils.
223. Fairkn and Soils Judgment, at para. 160: "...podria dar lugar a la
presuncibn ... "
224. Report by David P. Grimes, Examiner of Questioned Documents, entered into the rec-
ord of the Fairbn and Soils case, by Commission brief of January 19, 1988. The Commission
simultaneously presented other findings of the fact-gathering trip to Guatemala which suggested
the fabrication of immigration records perpetrated in early 1982. On March 2, 1988, the Guate-
malan government submitted a report to the Court stating that, after an internal investigation, it
now was of the opinion that Fair6n and Soils had never entered Guatemalan territory. See Fairn
and Soils Judgment, at para. 39.
225. Report of August 12, 1988 (cited in Fairbn and Soils Judgment, at paras. 38 & 45).
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Oliveros report, and the fact that it was at least inconsistent with the
findings of another, very highly qualified expert. The Commission also
submitted the affidavit of a recent defector of Battalion 316 who stated
that document forgery was a specific task of some Battalion operatives.
The December 5th brief did not, however, request an opportunity to
cross-examine the Venezuelan expert (the Commission had offered to
produce Mr. Grimes for a hearing if the Court so desired). In retro-
spect, since the Court relied so heavily on the Venezuelan's report, it
would have been important for the evidence he produced to be openly
confronted and cross-examined. The Court itself should have called the
expert witness to answer each member's questions about the rationale
behind his findings.2 z6
New opportunities for expert testimony took place in the context
of Godinez and Velbsquez after the decision on the merits, during spe-
cial proceedings to determine the extent of damages to be paid to the
families. The Commission team obtained the pro bono cooperation of
noted psychiatrists Federico Allodi from Toronto, Cecile Rousseau
from Montreal, and Walter Pereira from San Jos6, Costa Rica. The
psychiatrists travelled to Honduras to conduct an evaluation of the psy-
chological effects of the disappearances of Godinez and Veldsquez on
their wives and children. After extensive interviews, they presented a
full report to the Court.227 At a hearing on the issue of damages, Dr.
Allodi took the stand to expand on the report and to answer questions
about it.
E. The Court's Control of the Record
On July 13, 1988, the Commission filed a long, comprehensive
brief, only two weeks before the Court was to meet for the decision in
Velibsquez. The President rejected the brief and excluded it from the
record on July 14, 1988, citing "the procedure opportunely established"
that supposedly barred any further proffers of evidence or arguments.
A section of the Commission's brief .was entered into the record, be-
cause it dealt with a response to a specific request by the Court about
226. Commission brief of December 5, 1988. See also Fairbn and Soils Judgment, at para.
46.
227. Allodi, et al, Evaluacibn de Efectos psicolbgicos de las desapariciones de Godinez y
Velbsquez sobre sus esposas e hijos [Evaluation of psychological effects of the disappearance of
Godinez and Veldsquez on their wives and children] entered into the record of Velhsquez and
Godinez cases, by Commission brief and by separate brief by lawyers for relatives, both of March
10, 1989. Godinez, Compensation Judgment, paras. 8 & 9.
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an inquiry with the'Government of Guatemala.22 The July 14th ruling
also made reference to the need for maintaining procedural balance
between the parties to the litigation. Otherwise, there was no mention
of any regulation of the Court, or of any decision by the Court, prop-
erly notifying the parties of time limits or deadlines for the submission
of briefs. In addition, this standard was applied inconsistently, because
six months later the Commission was allowed to file a brief which was
indistinguishable in nature from the July 13th motion, though making
different arguments.
The genesis of the President's decision seems to be that, in the
weeks before the Court was to meet again, the Honduras Delegate
(who is also Honduran Ambassador to Costa Rica) informally ap-
proached the Court and asked verbally if his Government could file a
brief summarizing its position. The President was consulted and the
answer was no: there were no further opportunities for submissions.229
The "procedure opportunely established" in the July 14th ruling is an
apparent reference to a verbal agreement allegedly reached between
the parties and the President, during an earlier session of the Court. If
so, in the absence of clear procedural standards in the Court's regula-
tions, the President should have at least issued a ruling earlier on, to
make sure that all interested participants were properly placed on
notice.
This procedural matter is important because of the significance of
the July 13th submission. In that brief, the Commission team had at-
tempted to summarize the evidence presented and to comment on it. At
the first full session on the merits there had been an opportunity for
closing arguments (October 7, 1987); however, at least seven other wit-
nesses testified afterwards, and multiple pieces of documentary evi-
dence were incorporated afterwards as well. The brief was also an op-
portunity to comment on important matters such as the standard of
evidence to be used in a sui generis proceeding and on the protection of
witnesses. The brief also specifically requested the imposition of attor-
neys' fees and court costs. The Court later ruled that no court costs or
attorneys' fees would be assessed to Honduras because the matter had
not been brought up.230
Since it was mid-July, the decision in Velbsquez was almost ready
228. Fairkn and Soils Judgment, at paras. 41-42 (citing Commission brief of July 13, 1988,
called Observaciones Finales [Final Observations] and July 14 decision by the President of the
Court (Chief Justice)).
229. Authors' interview with Court officials, July 29, 1988.
230. Velsquez Judgment, at para. 193.
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and the Court may have wanted to avoid a delay, especially considering
that the Court meets only twice a year. The Godinez and Fairn-Solis
cases were not decided in July, but went on for several more months.
Without overturning the balance between the parties, the Court could
have allowed the July 13th brief to be entered into the record of those
two cases and given the Honduran government an opportunity to
respond.
VIII. DAMAGES
The Court ordered the Honduran government to compensate the
families of Veldsquez and Godinez for the harm caused to them as a
result of the disappearances of their relatives. "3' In this matter the
Convention provides that:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or free-
dom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the in-
jured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that
was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences
of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right
or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the
injured party."'2
The Court's majority opinion in Velbsquez directed negotiations to
take place between the Commission and the Honduran government,
with respect to the matter of form and amount of compensation. The
only issue which caused dissent within the Court was the negotiation
process in the Vellsquez decision. Justice Rodolfo Piza Escalante dis-
agreed with the exclusion of Manfredo Veldsquez's relatives from di-
rect participation in the negotiation process. Under Justice Piza's inter-
pretation of the rules of the Commission and of the Court, the families
must be considered parties in the process.233
The Court retained jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of
verifying the agreement between Honduras and the Commission, or to
settle it if an agreement was not reached within six months.23"
In fact, the negotiations were totally fruitless. The Honduran gov-
ernment, involved with internal disputes over the fairness of the sen-
tence, showed no interest in even meeting with the Commission.235 Af-
231. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 194.5; Godinez Judgment, at para. 203.5.
232. Article 63(1) of the Convention.
233. See Velbisquez Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Piza Escalante).
234. Velbsquez Judgment, at paras. 194.6 & 194.7.
235. It is important to note that Honduran officials, according to press reports, expressed
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ter repeatedly seeking a dialogue, the Commission did meet on one
occasion with the Honduran government in Tegucigalpa in January
1989.236
Because the Velizsquez negotiations failed, the Court did not insist
on applying the same technique in the Godinez judgment. Instead, it
ruled that after hearing from interested parties, the Court would deter-
mine the form and amount of compensation.3 In this manner the
Court was able to reach a unanimous judgment, without raising again
the issue of who would be a "party" under the Convention. Moreover,
on the same day of the Godinez judgment on the merits, the Court
issued separate resolutions in Godinez and Velibsquez, authorizing the
President of the Court to ask the relatives of the victims, the Commis-
sion and the Honduran government their respective opinions on the
matter of damages or compensation. This resolution left the door open
for a hearing on the issue." 8 A special hearing on damages was held on
March 15th, 1989, at the request of the families' representatives. " '
The Commission stated its perspective about compensation within
a somewhat limited theoretical framework. The strategy exposed the
purpose of avoiding predictable disagreements between the Commission
and the families. In effect, two major differences divided them: first,
the amount of money that the Commission was willing to request was
significantly lower than that proposed by the families, and second, the
Commission was reluctant to incorporate the concept of punitive dam-
ages as part of the compensation the government of Honduras should
pay.
Representatives of the families, with the consent of the Commis-
sion, elicited the assistance of three well-known professors of psychiatry
specialized in therapy for victims of human rights violations.2"' The
team of doctors traveled to Honduras and interviewed relatives of
Godinez and Veldsquez in preparation for showing the gravity of their
reluctance to accept the Court's decision.
236. The Commission was placed in the uncomfortable position of not having any real man-
date from the relatives of the victim to engage in negotiations over delicate issues concerning their
exclusive interests. During the only meeting between the Commision and Honduras both parties
agreed only on the identity of the recipients of damages. See Velhsquez Compensation Judgment,
at para. 22.
237. Godinez Judgment, at para. 201.
238. The Court's interim resolutions in Velhsquez and Godinez, January 20, 1989.
239. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 6 & 12; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 5 & 11.
240. They were Federico Allodi, M.D. and Cecile Rousseau, M.D. of Canada, and Walter
Pereira, M.D. of Costa Rica.
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suffering since the disappearance of the victims. The psychiatrists pro-
duced a report which was submmitted by the Commission to the Court
as proof of the extent of emotional injuries.24' One of the psychiatrists
later testified at the hearing before the Court.4
The Commission and the relatives of the victims agreed that repa-
ration pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Convention should provide not
only for monetary compensation but for ethical redress as well. Both
presentations essentially requested ethical reparation grounded on the
Convention's principle that obligates the government to repair all con-
sequences of human rights violations, in addition to the government's
duty to pay an injured party fair compensation.24 According to both
the Commission and the lawyers for the families, such an ethical duty
required the Honduran government to conduct an exhaustive investiga-
tion and to prosecute those responsible for the disappearances. 44 In ad-
dition, as part of the ethical reparation, the parties asked that the Hon-
duran government publicly repudiate the policy of forced
disappearances and also publicly apologize to the families.
According to the Commission and the relatives, monetary damages
should include out-of-pocket expenses, or damnum emergens (court
costs, past and future medical treatment); loss of income, or lucrum
cessans (based on the last salary of the victims and possible promotions
until their deaths); and emotional damages (for psychological injury
suffered by the next of kin as a result of the anguish and uncertainty
surrounding the fate of the victims). In Latin American countries,
damages for pain and suffering are commonly known as "moral dam-
ages" (daho moral). The families added punitive damages because of
the extreme gravity of the violation.245
The Honduran government objected to the demand that it should
publicly condemn the practice of disappearance and conduct an investi-
gation as a part of the compensation requested by the Commission and
241. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 10.
242. Id. at para. 12.
243. "It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be
paid to the injured party." Article 63(1) of the Convention (emphasis added). Article 63(l)
clearly gives the Court the authority to order a government to remedy any effects of State crimi-
nal activities.
244. The families asked to go beyond this, requiring the Court to draw up a schedule and to
monitor the government's compliance. See Velhisquez Compensation Judgment at para. 9.
245. The relatives' representatives estimated the total amount of damages in the VeiTsquez
case as approximately $3,270,000 and $3,000,000 in the Godinez case. Vel6squez Compensation
Judgment, at para. 9; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at para. 8.
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families. The government stated: "[it] (the judgment) is very clear and
precise as to the obligation imposed on Honduras to pay damages,
namely, to pay fair compensation to the next of kin of the victim, and
nothing more."2" The Honduran government also proposed that mone-
tary compensation should be based on Honduran domestic law. The
government explained that the "most beneficial" system offered in
Honduras would be applied in determining compensation. The most
beneficial system was supposed to be the National Teacher's Social Se-
curity Institute's schedule for cases of accidental death, and there were
no procedural problems since both victims happened to have been
teachers.24 7 The Honduran government offered 150.000 lempiras (ap-
prox. $50,000) as compensation for the relatives of Manfredo Velds-
quez and 60.000 lempiras (approx. $20,000) for the family of Safil
Godinez.2"
A. The Decision of the Court
On July 21, 1989 the Court issued judgments on damages in Ve-
lsquez and Godinez. The Court took particular care to clarify that
international jurisprudence and human rights treaties embrace the con-
cept of reparation for injury caused by a breach of a State's interna-
tional obligation as a clear principle of international law.24 9 The Court
further stated that reparation implied full restitution (restitutio in in-
tegrum), which includes "restoration of the previous situation and repa-
ration for the consequences of the breach, plus payment of an indem-
nity to compensate for property and non-property damages, including
moral damage. 2 50 Rejecting Honduras' claim, the Court held that
compensation should be settled based on the Convention and interna-
tional principles, without reference to Honduran domestic law.2 51
With respect to the demands for ethical reparations the Court re-
fused to include them expressly as part of the compensation. In the
246. Velhsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 14; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 13.
247. According to the Commission's information, the best system of compensation in Hon-
duras is offered by the Institute of Military Pensions. See Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at
paras. 11, 43 & 44; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 10 & 41.
248. Id.
249. Velhsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 25, 28 & 29; Godinez Compensation
Judgment, at paras. 23, 26 & 27.
250. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 26; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 24.
251. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 30 & 31; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 28 & 29.
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Court's view, Article 63(1) of the Convention only provides for mone-
tary reparation as part of compensation to the victims' families. 52
The Court did, however, refer to the judgment on the merits as
establishing an obligation on the part of the government to prevent,
investigate and punish the perpetrators of violations, and to disclose all
information available to the families. In the decisions on damages, the
Court held that this duty remains binding, with the same force as the
operative part of the judgment, until the Honduran government fully
complies.253
The Court held that out-of-pocket expenses (damnum emergens)
was a legitimate element of compensation, but ruled that they had
neither been adequately documented nor claimed on time.254
Before determining the amount of lost income, the Court declared
that any assessment should be made prudently and on a case by case
basis, keeping in mind that there exist two different situations: first,
when the recipient is the actual victim who may be left incapacitated;
and second, when the recipients are relatives of a deceased victim. Fol-
lowing this distinction, the Court held that the amount of compensation
should be less in the second situation because relatives have, at least in
principle, "the possibility, currently or in the future, of working or
earning income on their own." 255
The Court declared that loss of income should be calculated on the
basis of the amount the victim would have earned up until his or her
natural death. It strongly rejected the Honduran government's effort to
treat the disappearances of Manfredo Veldsquez and Saul Godinez as
"accidental deaths."25  Instead of calculating the projected earnings of
both victims for their expected natural lives, the Court settled the
amount of lost income in Velbsquez at 500.000 lempiras (approx.
$165,000) and in Godinez at 400.000 lempiras (approx. $133,000).257
252. "Measures of this sort would constitute part of the reparation for the consequences of
the situation in violation of the rights and freedoms, but not of the compensation cited in Article
63.1 of the Convention." Velbisquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 33 (emphasis' added);
Godinez Compensation Judgment, at para. 31.
253. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 34-36; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 32-34.
254. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 41 & 42; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 39 & 40.
255. Velsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 47-48; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 45 & 46.
256. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 46; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 44.
257. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 49; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 47.
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In practical terms, the Court's rationale frustrates the purpose of
deterrence. What results is that a government that engages in disap-
pearances and extrajudicial executions is held to pay more monetary
compensation for a victim left alive but incapacitated than for one who
is murdered. Thus, the Court's ability to deter unjust and inhumane
behavior through its decisions may have produced just the opposite re-
sult. The Court's rationale for reducing the compensation based upon
the wives' and children's ability to work is not persuasive. The family's
ability to work is irrelevant because their ability to work is not depen-
dent on whether or not the father lives. The income lost because of the
father's disappearance or disability is unavailable to them in either
case.
The Court based its determination of the amount of moral dam-
ages principally on the medical report and oral testimony of one of the
psychiatrists about the serious psychological injury suffered by the rela-
tives of the victims as a direct result of the disappearance of Manfredo
Veldsquez and Safil Godinez. The Court also found it obvious that the
disappearances had led harmful psychological consequences on the
families of the victims. The Court ordered Honduras to pay, as moral
damages, 250.000 lempiras (approx. $80,000) to each of the families of
Veldsquez and Godinez.158
B. Form of Payment: Some Observations
The Court ruled that compensation was to be paid within ninety
days of the date of the judgment. 59 However, the Court allowed Hon-
duras to pay in six monthly payments if it so chose, the first one to be
due in ninety days and the rest during the successive months, with
interest.260
Only one fourth of the total compensation is to be paid to the
spouses of the victims, who shall receive the money directly. The re-
mainder is to be distributed among the children by way of a trust es-
tablished in the Central Bank of Honduras "under the most favorable
terms available in Honduran banking practice."261 The children will be
able to earn interest on the trust at monthly intervals, and each one will
258. Velhtsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 50-52; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 48-50.
259. On October 21, 1989, the deadline for payment expired.
260. Velhsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 57; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 52.
261. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 58; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 53.
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receive his or her equal portion of the trust at the age of twenty-five.
The Court shall supervise all parts of Honduras' compliance in this
process. 2 '
The Compensation judgment contains no protection with respect to
the effect of devaluation of the local currency. This point is particularly
relevant in Latin America, a continent with highly dependent and un-
stable economies, where inflation and loss of buying power are serious
and recurring historical problems. Between 1983 and 1988, Latin
America suffered an average inflation of 721 percent, an annual aver-
age of 144 percent.2 6 8
This issue is particularly dramatic in the case of the younger chil-
dren of the victims. Emma Patricia, the daughter of Safil Godinez, was
born on May 2, 1982 and will receive her portion seventeen years from
now. If the Court does not establish some kind of mechanism to protect
Emma Patricia's compensation, she will very likely receive a symbolic
check in May of 2007. Interest rates constitute a partial protection
against inflation, since they will presumably keep some relationship
with it. They will not, however, protect against sudden devaluation of
the Honduran currency. Besides, since the Court has ordered the pay-
ment of interest, the beneficiaries are owed interest under a separate
title than the principal, the integrity of which needs specific protection.
Without some preventive measures against devaluation, the children's
right to fair compensation is not only subject to sudden peril but the
reparatory value of the Court's judgment is weakened.
The Commission requested a clarification from the Court on the
question of protecting the trust, based on Article 67 of the Convention
and Article 48 of the Rules of the Court. The request of the Commis-
sion suggested some mechanisms to protect the stability of the purchas-
ing power of the award. It was presented to the Court on September
29, 1989 and is still awaiting the Court's final decision.
C. The Issue of Punitive Damages
There is no doubt that the Court's judgments represent an ex-
traordinary precedent in the field of international human rights law
and provide concrete and useful guidelines for the defense of human
rights in Latin America. These decisions have crystallized a long and
262. Velhsquez Compensation Judgment, at para. 59; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at
para. 54.
263. Report of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, OEA/ser.H-X/47/CIES-
4455 (1989)(orig. Spanish).
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often lonely struggle by human rights NGOs to condemn the crime of
disappearances throughout the continent. Finally, their efforts have re-
ceived the institutional support of an international court of law.
The families' lawyers, committed to seeking the most effective
human rights protection in Latin America and total eradication of the
practice of disappearances, requested punitive damages as part of the
full compensation to be paid by Honduras.""
Given the Convention's purpose, to promote human dignity and
prevent future human rights violations, the attorneys creatively inter-
preted the Convention to mean that Honduras was required to pay pu-
nitive damages. In addition, the families' lawyers argued that the ex-
emplary character of such compensation would help reestablish social
peace in Honduras, restore confidence in the rule of law, and act as an
impediment to the repetition of this perverse practice. Essentially, puni-
tive damages could provide a vital check on the abuse of power and
protect and promote truth and trust.285
In their efforts to obtain punitive damages, the relatives' lawyers
stated that the Court was not confronting an isolated and private
crime, but a series of crimes: horrendous human rights violations which
resulted from deliberate and official State policies; violations of funda-
mental rights and imperative rules of international law (jus cogens)
and crimes that represent - in the words of the OAS General Assem-
bly - "an affront to the conscience of the hemisphere and constitute a
crime against humanity. 268
A group of prominent law professors from eight different countries
affirmed that monetary compensation must act as a deterrent against
State-sponsored crime and must be fashioned so as to discourage future
human rights violations, especially disappearances. The jurists urged
the Court not to treat the issue of compensation as a private tort case,
which might result from accidental or wrongful death.26 7 The award
264. On the issue of punitive damages, the first reported cases are: Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng.
Rep. 489 (1763) and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). Both cases involved police
searches with no or insufficient warrants in England against political dissidents. For a discussion
on punitive damages, see 40 ALA. L. REV. I (1989)[the entire issue is dedicated to the topic of
punitive damages].
265. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 739 (1989).
266. Velbsquez Judgment, at para. 153; Godinez Judgment, at para. 161.
267. Amici Curiae on the issue of compensation presented to the INTER-AM. CT. H.R. by
Professors Jean-Denis Archambault, Alejandro Artucio, Alfredo Etcheberry, Gustavo Gall6n
Giraldo, Diego Garcia-Saydn, Alejandro M. Garro, Robert K. Goldman, Jorge Mera, Denis
Racicot, Joaquin Ruiz Gim(nez, Arturo Valencia Zea and Eugenio Raol Zaffaroni, March 10,
1989, at 30. On the same issue, ACAFADE also submitted a Brief Amicus Curiae. See Velasquez
Compensation Judgment, at para. 19; Godinez Compensation Judgment, at para. 19.
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should take into consideration the vile and wanton nature of the crime
itself, as well as its societal repercussions at the national and interna-
tional levels. In the view of the prestigious "friends of the Court," in
the present cases there existed "not only the necessity for justice in a
particular case, but also the prestige of the Court [was involved], as
well as the credibility of the Inter-American system for human rights
protection and the interest of the international community in human
rights promotion." '268
These legal scholars also expanded the concept of an "injured
party" to cover not only the direct victim of the violation, but also Hon-
duran society, the State Parties to the Convention, and the interna-
tional community.2 69 Thus, punitive damages concern not only injuries
to the victim and his or her family, but to the entire community that
shares collective values.27
The Court, interpreting the provisions of Article 63(1) as compen-
satory and not punitive in character, refused to accept the punitive
damages demand. The Court strictly limited the concept of "injured
party" to apply only to the families of the victim, and declared - with-
out further explanation - that the notion of punitive damages is not a
current principle of international law.27'
D. Lack of Compliance by Honduras
In accordance with the Court's order, Honduras should have paid
the full amount of the awards by October 20, 1989. As of this writing,
however, no payment has been made. In November of 1989, the gov-
ernment of Honduras submitted a bill to its Congress to make a budg-
etary provision to confront this obligation. Congress went into recess,
however, without acting on the request.
In January of 1990, the Commission asked the Court to insist on
prompt payment. In February of 1990, the government of Honduras
sent a note to the Court explaining that the new request for appropria-
tion had been submitted to the Honduran legislature. It is expected
that the matter will come before the Court again in July of 1990.
268. Id. at 16.
269. The State violated an obligation considered under international law as an erga omnes
obligation. Id. at 6-7; see also Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. Ltd., I.C.J. paras. 33-34
(1970).
270. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA.
L. REV. 1079, 1102 (1989).
271. Velbsquez Compensation Judgment, at paras. 37-39; Godinez Compensation Judg-
ment, at paras. 35-37.
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X. CONCLUSION
The case against Honduras is not quite complete; the government
of Honduras has yet to pay the amounts established by the Court as
damages to the widows and children of Sail Godinez and Manfredo
Veld.squez. The Court also has yet to rule on the interpretation re-
quested by the Commission on means to protect the damages award
from devaluation. For the most part, however, the litigation is over.
The authors believe that a major, historical step has been taken to im-
prove the international protection of fundamental human rights. The
critique of different aspects of the proceedings and of the decisions, as
set forth in the preceding pages, in no way detracts from the spectacu-
lar achievement of having put "disappearances" on trial, and having
issued the first judicial condemnation of that criminal practice.
The experience of three years of litigation coming to an end, it is
now a good time to take stock of what has been accomplished and what
must be improved upon in future cases. The preceding pages are writ-
ten in that spirit. We cannot end this article, however, without observ-
ing that there are no new "contentious" (adversarial) cases before the
Court. Since the Honduras cases, the Commission has only twice "in-
vited" a State to accept the jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc
basis, and in both cases that invitation has been declined.272
The commission has not submitted any case against a State that is
bound by the Court's jurisdiction. Petitioners have submitted to the
Commission dozens of cases that could be forwarded to the Court
under either of these procedures. Though the several steps in the proce-
dure before the Commission are long and cumbersome, there are many
cases that are ripe for submission to the Court, and yet their resolution
by the Commission has been repeatedly postponed. The Commission
continues to avoid sending cases to the Court, in exercise of what it
interprets it to be its very broad discretion as to which cases to submit.
Justices of the Court have spoken out and have published com-
ments regarding this issue, expressing their opinions that it is a serious
problem for the future of the system.27 They advocate a regimen by
which every contentious case would routinely be submitted to the Court
after the Commission has ruled on the merits of the complaint. Given
the large number of cases in the Commission's docket, this proposal
272. See note 63 and accompanying text.
273. Speech by Thomas Buergenthal at the American University, October 28, 1988; speech
by Hector Gros Espiell at Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, University of Chile, August 18,
1989.
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presents logistical and practical problems. We believe, nonetheless, that
it would be preferable to the present system, in which the Court is
grossly underutilized. The Commission could very well issue internal
guidelines regulating the exercise of the discretionary powers that it
now enjoys in this regard, and determining - for example - that all
cases in which the Commission ruled against a State on the merits
would automatically be submitted to the Court. If this were to happen,
the Commission would need to reorganize its daily work so as to main-
tain a manageable docket of active cases. As it happens, there are
many complaints in which the action of the Commission is most valua-
ble as an emergency procedure; in those cases, with the consent of the
complainants, the Commission could treat them as urgent actions and
not open up a "case" file under the procedure stipulated by the Con-
vention. A smaller number of cases could then be rigorously processed,
creating substantial records with the active cooperation of complainants
and governments. Terms and mandatory steps would then be observed
more strictly and, once a full record has been created including all rele-
vant facts and valid legal arguments, each case could be submitted to
the Court.
We think that such a proposal is viable and desirable, and we do
not think that it would demand greater expenditures during a severe
budgetary crisis at the Organization of American States. In fact, with
proper reorganization of its resources, the Commission can treat cases
in this manner while at the same time continue to conduct on-site visits
and country reports and proposals for international law-making, all of
which have distinguished its work in the past.
If such a proposal is not adopted, we think that the Commission
must at least prepare and publish clear guidelines for the submission of
cases to the Court. Victims of human rights abuse have a right to know
what kind of burden they have to meet if they want to have their cases
heard by an international tribunal. Under the present system, when vic-
tims come to practitioners in this field, the latter are obliged to tell
them that there is simply no assurance that, at the end of years of
patient processing before the Commission, the case will get to the
Court. In fact, practitioners must tell their prospective clients that a
decision to submit the case will be made, when the time comes, on
purely political or diplomatic grounds, not on the merits of legal argu-
ments. There is no question that, under the Convention, the Commis-
sion enjoys broad discretion to make such a decision.174 Discretion,
274. As explained supra note 81 and accompanying text, the only other way to take a case
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however, can and should be regulated, because otherwise it lends itself
to whim and arbitrariness. If complainants knew at the start what kind
of showing they have to make to get their cases submitted to the Court,
it would greatly facilitate the work of human rights organizations and
practitioners, and it would also make the Commission's work more effi-
cient and effective.
In addition, the Commission and the Court must use their staff
and material resources more effectively in the production of evidence
and in fact-finding. By the time a case is ripe to go to the Court, the
Commission must have built a solid record that leaves no useful fact
out. The cooperation of complainants (and occasionally of the State) is
now the only tool used by the system to create a record. Yet there is
nothing in the Convention or in the regulations that prevents the Com-
mission from deploying staff attorneys to look for documentary or testi-
monial evidence at the Commission's own initiative. In many cases, im-
portant information and documentation is simply unavailable to the
victim of human rights abuse, but the authorities may decide to make
it available to the Commission. In the Honduras litigation, the inactiv-
ity of the Commission (and of the Court) forced the victims, the peti-
tioners and their attorneys to conduct very expensive fact-finding and
to bring witnesses from several countries before the Court at different
times. Generous contributions from several sources were not hard to
raise for this purpose, given the historic nature of this first case; it is
safe to predict, however, that such support will not always be there.
The Court must also use its own resources to get closer to the
truth. Justices and officials of the Court are empowered to travel to
other countries, to request and look for documents and records, and to
interview witnesses who, for a variety of reasons, may not be brought to
the seat of the Court for a public hearing.275 In many cases, that might
be the only way in which such evidence can be produced. In the Hon-
duras cases, there were witnesses interviewed by the authors of this
article that simply could not be convinced of the need to come forward
and travel to Costa Rica for a public hearing. Under existing rules,
however, they could have been interviewed by an officer of the Court,
or even by a commission of the members of the Court duly delegated,
to the Court is through a petition of a State party to the Convention. Except in the very unlikely
case of a national of a country who is wronged by a different State (and both States being parties
to the Convention), this avenue is simply unavailable to the victims of human rights violations
for political and diplomatic reasons.
275. Article 25, Statute of the Court; Articles 4.2, 6.2 and especially 22.2 & 34.2, Rules of
Procedure of the Court.
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and their information could have been before the Court. There is no
need to insist on the advantages that the Court enjoys over private liti-
gants when it comes to access to official documents and information. As
long as an effort is made to maintain the necessary procedural guaran-
tees of equality of and balance between the parties to the litigation, a
dynamic and aggressive search for the truth can only benefit the credi-
bility of the Court and its effectiveness.
